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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
 
On 30 September 2005 a Danish newspaper called Jyllands-Posten published an article called 
the ‘Face of Muhammad’.  This article was about self-censorship and the fear of Muslim 
backlash.  It contained 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.1  The 12 cartoons, 
published by Jyllands-Posten, caused a worldwide uproar and pitted supporters of freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion against each other.2  One of these cartoons showed the 
Prophet wearing a headdress shaped like a bomb and inscribed on the headdress was the 
kalimah (the words where one declares his/her intention to become a Muslim), another cartoon 
indicated the Prophet saying that paradise is running short of virgins for suicide bombers.3  
Muslims the world over were outraged at these cartoons as insulting the Prophet is against the 
religion of Islam.4  This culminated in riots, violent protests, kidnapping and death threats as well 
as boycotts of Danish products and diplomatic arguments.5  Journalist and newspaper 
publishers were claiming protection under their right to freedom of expression.6 
The first newspaper to publish the cartoons in South Africa was the Mail & Guardian in its edition 
dated 3 February to 9 February 2006.7  On Friday 3 February 2006 Jamiat-Ul-Ulama, voluntary 
Muslim association in Transvaal, discovered that the Sunday Times were going to publish the 
Muhammad cartoons.  The first thing they did was try to get an undertaking by the Sunday 
Times that it would not publish the cartoons and when this failed they sought an urgent interim 
order in the Johannesburg High Court to prohibit the publishers and printers of the newspaper 
                                                                  
1Holland G ‘Drawing the Line: Balancing Religious Vilification Laws and Freedom of Speech’ (2006) 8 University 
of Technology, Sydney. Law Review 9-10. 
2Modood T, Hansen R, Bleich E, O’Leary B & Carens J ‘The Danish Cartoon Affair: Free Speech, Racism, 
Islamism, and Integration’ (2006) 44 The Author Journal Compilation 1-62. 
3Holland G (2006) 9-10. See also Cobb K ‘The Muhammad Cartoons’ (2006) The Author Journal Compilation 1. 
4Goolam N ‘The Cartoon Controversy: A Note on Freedom of Expression, Hate speech and Blasphemy’ 2006 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 343. 
5Asmal F Islamophobia and The Media: The Portrayal of Islam since 9/11 and an Analysis of the Danish Cartoon 
Controversy in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2008) 47. 
6Hashmi SZ ‘Danish Cartoons: Islam vs. Freedom of Expression’ available at www.desipad.com (accessed 19 
October 2009). 
7Pillay K ‘The Cartoon Wars: Free Speech or Hate Speech?’ (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 465. 
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from publishing and distributing the cartoons.8  An urgent rule nisi was granted by the court 
which prohibited the publication of the cartoons.9 
Seven years have passed since the Danish cartoons were first published however the tension 
between supporters of freedom of religion and freedom of expression is still ongoing.  In 
September 2012 a short trailer for a supposed anti-Muslim film called ‘Innocence of Muslims’ 
was posted on YouTube.  This 14 minute clip depicts the Prophet Muhammad as a sex-crazed 
child molester and murderer and once again anger and outrage at this clip was expressed by 
Muslims in a string of riots.10 
This mini-thesis is based on the presumption that the Danish cartoons and the anti-Muslim clip 
posted on YouTube as forms of expression, ridiculed the religious beliefs and practices of 
Muslims which in turn affected the exercise of religious freedom as it violated the dignity of the 
bearers of the right to freedom of religion and therefore a conflict between the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression exists.11  The above incidence of conflict between the right to 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression involves infringing the freedom of religion of the 
Islamic community.12  Blasphemy in Islam is speech that is insulting to God, but during the 
course of Muslim history it has become increasingly linked with insult to the Prophet 
Muhammad.13  In Islam the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad in any way is strictly forbidden 
and is considered blasphemous.14 
In South Africa the right to freedom of religion and expression are rights entrenched in a Bill of 
Rights.  They are constitutional permissions that determine a constitutional status, its scope 
                                                                  
8Pillay K (2010) 466. 
9 JamiatUl-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncom Media Investment Ltd and Others (1127/06) [2006] ZAGPHC 12 (3 
February 2006). See Malherbe R ‘The Mohammed cartoon, freedom of expression and the infringement of the right 
to religious dignity’ (2007) 2 Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 336. 
10Basseley N ‘The Innocence of Muslim Riots’ available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/innocence_of_muslims_riots/index.html (accessed 12 
September 2012). See also Wise L ‘Bizarre YouTube clip Innocence of Muslim infuriated faithful’ available at 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/09/13/168434/bizarre-youtube-clip-innocence.html (accessed 12 September 
2012). 
11Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 2001) 110. See also Malherbe R (2007) 333. 
12Modood T, Hansen R, Bleich E, O’Leary B & Carens J (2006) 1-62. 
13Isḥāq I,  Ṣaḥīḥ B ‘Blasphemy in Islam ‘available at http://quranandinjil.org/pdfs/Blasphemy-in-Islam.pdf 
(accessed 17 May 2012). 
14Landscheidt D ‘The Conflict Between Western World and Islam’ available at 
http://www.landscheidt.com/The%20Islam.pdf (accessed 20 May 2012). 
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coincides with an individual sphere of inviolability and its function is to distribute freedom and 
power.15  The right to human dignity is closely related to freedom of religion.16  Under the South 
African Constitution, dignity is a core value and as a core value it guides courts in determining 
the purpose and scope of other rights contained in the Constitution such as freedom of 
religion.17  The right to religious dignity is a right which incorporates the right to freedom of 
religion and dignity and guarantees complete and total respect and dignity to the bearers of 
these rights.18  Bearers of the right to religious dignity enjoy the right to advance and cherish 
their religious beliefs while demanding respect from parties bound by this right.19 
In order for there to be a conflict between rights, one norm must make it permissible to do X and 
the other norm must deny the permission to do X.  This means the actions allowed by both rights 
are not jointly performable.20  Conflicts between human rights involves a deadlock as the 
Constitution confers rights on both parties who have equal status and whose rights are 
simultaneously enforceable; the only way to solve the conflict is by sacrificing one of the rights.21 
If the right to freedom of expression and religion conflict under the South African Constitution, 
the conflict is resolved by balancing these rights in terms of the Section 36 proportionality test.22  
A hierarchy of rights in the South African Constitution has constantly been rejected, meaning 
that one right is not more important than the other and will not automatically undermine another 
if they conflict.23  It is argued that balancing is not the best approach to dealing with a conflict of 
rights as it allows for limiting the value of basic liberties on the grounds of public interest, which 
are not recognised as human rights and because of this balancing, fails to respect the priority of 
                                                                  
15The Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa it enshrines the right of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity equality and freedom. See Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, section 7 and Zucca L Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflict of Fundamental Legal Rights in 
Europe and the USA (2007) 48. 
16Prince v President, Cape Law Society (2002) 2 SA 794 (CC). 
17Cheadle MH, Davis DM & Haysom NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 133. 
18  Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 2001) 110. 
19 Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 2001) 109-110. 
20Zucca L (2007) 50. 
21Zucca L (2007) 3. 
22Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 36. 
23 Iles K ‘A Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 
79. 
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human rights.24 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
The primary investigation of this mini-thesis is to determine if ridiculing a religious belief which 
infringes on a person’s right to religious dignity causes a conflict between the application of the 
right to freedom of expression and the application of the right to freedom of religion under the 
South African Constitution.  If such a conflict exists, then the secondary investigation is to 
establish an appropriate manner in which this conflict may be addressed.   
1.3 Aims of the research 
 
The objective of this mini- thesis is to determine whether a genuine conflict between freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression exist under the South African Constitution and to provide 
suggestions which could be used to resolve conflicts between rights in order for both rights to be 
recognized and honoured. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
 
Solving the problem of conflicting rights could influence the scope of the right and the level of 
protection given to citizens will also be affected.  The issue of conflicting rights is vital as it 
stands at the crossroad of different enquiries related to theories of rights.  Understanding how to 
deal with a conflict of rights allows us to look more deeply into the basic problem we face 
collectively, and to measure the strengths and weaknesses of the rights’ discourse within our 
constitutional democracy25.  The tension that underlies a conflict of rights cannot be dispelled 
altogether but it can be better accepted if it is explained and justified.  In the post 9/11 age, 
increased tension between freedom of religion and expression have arisen; this paper will 
                                                                  
24Zucca L(2007) 90. 
25Zucca L(2007) x. 
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contribute to the debate on this topic.26 
1.5 Methodology 
 
A qualitative research methodology will be employed for this study.  An analytical and 
prescriptive approach will be used.  Reference will be made to legislation and case law relevant 
to the topic.  Academic writings and scholarly articles will be consulted. 
1.6 Chapter overview  
 
This mini-thesis will have five chapters: 
Chapter two discusses incidents where the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression have come into conflict with each other and theories on solving conflict of rights in 
order to establish how to deal with a conflict of rights.  This chapter commences the discussion 
by providing the historical and philosophical context of the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression.  It then discusses the Salman Rushdie Affair and the Danish cartoon 
controversy as incidents of conflict between the right to freedom of religion and the right to 
freedom of expression in order to determine how these incidents dealt with the conflict.  It finally 
discusses Habermas’ Theory on solving conflicts and Konrad Hesse’s notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz in order to determine how to address a conflict of rights. 
Chapter three determines whether a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression exists under international human rights law.  It discusses the scope of 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression under the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in order to determine whether a conflict exists under International law.  
Cases decided by the European Court of Justice (ECtHR), which have dealt with the conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression, will be discussed in order to determine 
the regional regulation of these rights and how the mechanisms which ensure compliance of 
                                                                  
26Kierulf A & Rønning H Freedom of Speech Abridged? Cultural, Legal and Philosophical Challenges (2009) 102. 
For further reading see Asmal F Islamophobia and the Media: The Portrayal of Islam since 9/11 and an Analysis of 
the Danish Cartoon Controversy in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2008) 30- 46. 
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these rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) dealt with the conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression. 
Chapter four determines firstly whether a conflict between the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression exists under the South African constitution and secondly whether our 
courts’ approach in the case of Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncom Media Investment Ltd 
and Others was the correct approach when dealing with a conflict between rights.  It examines 
the scope of freedom of religion and freedom of expression under the South African Constitution.  
South Africa’s approach to dealing with a conflict of rights is then discussed followed by an 
analysis of this case Jamiat-Ul-Ulama v Johncom Media Investment Ltd and Others. 
The last chapter concludes the discussion and provides a few recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter Two 
Incidents where the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression have come into conflict with each other 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
No religion can be permitted to legislate for everyone about what can or cannot be 
drawn anymore than it can legislate about what may or may not be eaten.  No one's 
religious convictions can be thought to trump the freedom that makes democracy 
possible.27 
The above quotation is Ronald Dworkin’s conclusion on the Danish cartoon controversy 
and the right to ridicule religious beliefs.  The publication of the Danish cartoons, which 
ridiculed the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, was a tragedy as indicated in section 1.1. of 
chapter one.  More than one hundred people died during the ensuing protest and riots 
and it is presumed by this mini-thesis that the cause of this violence resulted out of the 
conflict between the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.  Many 
arguments stemmed from the publication of the cartoons which where either in favour of 
the publication or against the publication.  According to Daglier and Schnieder, there are 
two opposing arguments resulting from the publication of the Danish cartoons; firstly 
that the Danish cartoons where published in order to emphasize the sacrosanct value of 
freedom of expression and the threat posed to it by religious zealotry, and secondly that 
the Danish cartoons were intended to mock and insult the religious beliefs of Muslims 
thereby abusing the right to freedom of expression and infringing a Muslim’s right to 
freedom of religion.28 
The former argument by Daglier and Schnieder is in favour of protecting freedom of 
                                                                  
27Dworkin R ‘Ronald Dworkin On the Right to Ridicule’ available at 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vl/notes/dworkin.html (accessed 1 November 2011). 
28Daglier U & Schneider TE ‘The Freedom of Expression in Global Perspective’ (2008) 45 Society 212. 
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expression and it is submitted by this mini-thesis that the essence of this argument is 
that freedom of expression is a condition of a legitimate government and in order for a 
law to be valid it has to be adopted through a democratic process; and if a government 
has prevented anybody from expressing their convictions of the law the process would 
not be democratic.29  Freedom of expression is therefore essential in a democratic 
society and in a democracy nobody can have a right not to be insulted or offended.30 
It is further submitted by this mini-thesis that the latter argument is in favour of limiting 
freedom of expression in order to protect freedom of religion.  According to Modood, as 
a result of the cartoons Muslims felt a sense of anger due to the fact that they were not 
respected and that their most cherished feelings and dignity were fair game.31  Mir 
argued that to Muslims, the Danish cartoons mocked and insulted the religion of Islam; 
the purpose was neither education nor discussion but rather an outlet of prejudice and 
hatred and an infringement of a Muslim’s right to freedom of religion.32  Goolam states 
that the publishing of the cartoons created a double standard between Islam and 
Christianity, and it exists because the same newspaper that printed the Danish cartoons 
refused to publish cartoons ridiculing Jesus for fear that it might offend some 
Christians.33 
Ridicule is a type of expression its substance cannot be repackaged in a less offensive 
rhetorical form without expressing something very different from what was intended’.34  
Freedom of expression protects the freedom to ridicule because sometimes it is 
necessary to use a little humour to prick the skin of sanctimonious piety which often 
                                                                  
29Dworkin R ‘Ronald Dworkin on the Right to Ridicule’ available at 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vl/notes/dworkin.html (accessed 1 November 2011). 
30Dworkin R ‘Ronald Dworkin on the right to ridicule’ available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vl/notes/dworkin.html 
(accessed 1 November 2011). 
31Modood T, Hansen R, Bleich E, O’Leary B & Carens J (2006) 4. 
32Mir AM ‘Holy Prophet, Freedom of Speech and Cartoon Controversy’ available at 
http://www.alislam.org/holyprophet/Holy-Prophet-Freedom-of-Speech-and-Cartoon-Controversy-20080321MN.pdf 
(accessed 22 November 2011). 
33Goolam N (2006) 346. 
34Dworkin R ‘Ronald Dworkin on the Right to Ridicule’ available at 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vl/notes/dworkin.html (accessed 1 November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
surrounds religious teachings.35  Offending expressions are not always an attack, 
criticism or comment that is purposeful and negative on the beliefs or faith at issue.  
Sometimes it’s simply a case of treating religious subjects in ways that others find 
improper or inappropriate.36  This mini-thesis submits that humour and ridicule is not the 
same thing but humour is used to ridicule, for example the Danish cartoons uses 
humour to ridicule the religious beliefs of Muslims, and as a result of this ridicule, as 
indicated in section 1.1 of chapter one, a conflict between freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression is created.  
According to Jones, freedom of expression on religious matters relates to two types of 
freedoms, firstly the freedom to express a belief or faith and secondly the freedom to 
express a view about a religion or a faith, such as a view that challenges, criticizes or 
ridicules it.37  The debate surrounding freedom of expression on religious matters 
focuses on insult and hatred; on the one side there are arguments in favour of 
protecting the right to freedom of expression at the expense of protecting a person’s 
religious beliefs and feelings from insult and ridicule, and on the other side there are 
arguments that freedom of expression should be limited in order to protect a person’s 
religious beliefs and feelings from ridicule and insult.38 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss incidents where the right to freedom of religion 
and freedom of expression have come into conflict with each other as well as theories 
on the conflict of human rights in order to establish how a conflict of human rights 
should be dealt with.  The incidence of conflict which this chapter will discuss is the 
Salman Rushdie Affair and the Danish Cartoon controversy.39  These two incidences of 
conflict relate to the religion of Islam.  This chapter will therefore be discussing the 
religion of Islam in order to understand why the indignity felt by adherents to the Islamic 
religion was so immense and more acutely perceived than other religions.   
                                                                  
35Singer P ‘The Freedom to Ridicule Religion and Deny the Holocaust’ available at 
http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=psinger_26_4 (accessed on 22 November 
2011). 
36Jones P ‘Introduction: Religion and Freedom of Expression’ (2011) 17 Res Publica 1-4. 
37Jones P (2011) 1-4. 
38Jones P (2011) 1-4. 
39These incidents have been chosen because they are most relevant to the conflict between freedom of religion and 
expression see Joffé G ‘Religion and Rationality’ available at 
http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2007/aarticles/aJoffe.pdf (accessed 12 December 2012). 
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Finally, Habermas’ Theory on solving conflicts and Konrad Hesse’s notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz will be discussed in this chapter.40  The historical and 
philosophical aspects of the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression will 
firstly be discussed in order to lay the foundation of these rights. 
2.2 The historical and philosophical context of the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression 
 
2.2.1 Freedom of religion 
 
The meaning of the word ‘religion’ is to bind fast, which comes from the Western Latin 
word religare.41  A religion is a set of beliefs which are intensely personal to a person.  
Acts of worship and demonstrations in a religion and are usually manifested in 
communities with others.42 
Following World War Two (WW2) the right to freedom of religion became one of the 
most important rights known to humanity; it formed part of the core of most conceptions 
of human rights.  The international community viewed the right to religious liberty as a 
privilege that is so foundational and precious that it should be guaranteed by 
international law.43  International law developed detailed provisions on the right to 
freedom of religion taking a two-pronged approach to the question of religious rights, 
namely the freedom to manifest religious beliefs and the freedom from religious bases 
discrimination.44 
Historically if you have practiced your religion you were granted protection if you did not 
                                                                  
40Crane RD ‘The Essence of Islamic law’ available at http://www.islamicity.com/politics/shariah.htm (accessed 23 
November 2011). 
41 Roan M ‘Study Guide: Freedom of Religion or Belief’ available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/studyguides/religion.html (accessed 25 November 2011).  
42The Human Right Committee has described religion or belief as theistic, non theistic, atheistic as well as the right 
not to profess any religion or belief  see Smith KM, Dr Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution 
of a Human Rights’ available at http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011). 
43Smith KM, Dr Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution of Human Rights’ available at 
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011).   
44The international regulation of freedom of religion after WW2 will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2.1 of 
chapter 3. See Smith KM Dr, Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution of Human Rights’ 
available at http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011). 
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pose a threat to the state.  For example in Rome you were allowed to practice your 
religious beliefs if it did not infringe the rules of the Roman Empire.45  One of the earliest 
documents to protect religious freedom was the treaty between King France 1 of France 
and Sultan Suleiman 1 of the Ottoman Empire in 1536 to ensure French merchants who 
lived in the Ottoman Empire would have religious freedom.46  In order to stop a 30 year 
war between the Catholics and Protestants the treaty of Westaphalia stated the 
following: 
Those of the Confession of Augsburg, and particularly the Inhabitants of Oppenheim, 
shall be put in possession again of their Churches, and Ecclesiastical Estates, as they 
were in the Year 1624. As also that all others of the said Confession of Augsburg, who 
shall demand it, shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in public Churches 
at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this 
purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, preaching the Word of 
God.47 
The First Amendment of the United States of America was established in 1791 and 
stated that ‘congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the exercise thereof’.48  This amendment has two parts: (1) the establishment clause 
which prevents congress from creating a religion and (2) the free exercise clause which 
prevents government from prohibiting, regulating or rewarding religious beliefs.  This 
amendment came about as a result of the civil fighting and the persecution by 
established sects for the purpose of maintaining their political and religious supremacy 
during the colonial era.49 
In 1789 the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was adopted by the 
National Assembly of France.  Article 10 of this declaration states that ‘No man is to be 
interfered with because of his opinions not even because of his religious opinions, 
                                                                  
45Smith KM, Dr Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution of Human Rights’ available at 
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011). 
46Vanderschyff G ‘The Historical Development of the Right to Freedom of Religion’ 2004 Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 270. 
47The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, article XXVIII. 
48The Constitution of the United States, 1787, First Amendment.  
49Okenu B P The Right to Freedom of Religion vis a vis Religious Intolerance in the New Millennium (LLM thesis, 
University of Georgia 2002) 3. 
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provided his avowal of them does not disturb public order as established by law’.50 
Religious minorities are historically the groups which are in need of protection.  The 
treaty of Berlin 1878 protected the religious minority; it placed obligations on the 
Government of the Balkans to respect the religious liberties of their populations.51  After 
World War One (WW1) the League of Nations oversaw the establishment of minority 
guarantee clauses which were placed in all the peace treaties signed after the WW1.52  
Following WW2 the United Nations Organization was established in 1945 together with 
its charter which states that its aim was to ‘Promote and encourage respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language 
and religion’.53  
In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) set the standard for the 
recognition of the right to freedom of religion, since then UDHR international and 
regional recognition of the right to freedom of religion has flourished.54 
Through its teachings, religions and beliefs have influenced the development of 
international law for example, all religions teach that you should treat others as you 
would like to be treated; this teaching of reciprocity has shaped humanitarian legal 
doctrine.55  Religions and beliefs have also been the cause of many conflicts and wars; 
most wars and conflicts have religious implications.56  Religion has been a great 
determinant of human existence.  It presupposes life itself, promises eternity, absolute 
truth and providence, which brings hope and consolation to many people. 
Enlightenment, reason and science has not affected religion or its practice.57 
                                                                  
50The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, article 10. 
51Smith KM, Dr Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution of Human Rights’ available at 
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011). 
52K M Smith, Dr Rhona & McIntosh C ‘Freedom of Religion: The Evolution of Human Rights’ available at 
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/i/smithr.html (accessed on 25 November 2011). 
53Vanderschyff G (2004) 259. 
54Vanderschyff G (2004) 271. 
55Bahiyyih GT Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (1996) 10. 
56Bahiyyih GT (1996) 10. 
57Okenu B P The Right to Freedom of Religion vis a vis Religious Intolerance in the New Millennium (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of Georgia 2002) 1. See also Rehman J ‘Accommodating Religious Identities in an Islamic 
State: International Law, Freedom of Religion and the Rights of Religious Minorities’ 2000 International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights 139. 
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Freedom of religion has also been confronted with an entirely new range of demands 
following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the aftermath of the 11 September 
attacks as well as the Danish cartoons.58  These new demands could not have been 
anticipated by the drafters of the core freedom of religion articles.  Demands such as 
religious hatred against Muslims (e.g. xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination), the 
call to control mass media in order to prevent incitement to violence and intolerance 
towards Muslims, and the demand to limit ridiculing and defamation of religions because 
it affects a person’s religious dignity have tested the text of the core and subsequent  
provisions to freedom of religion.59 
2.2.2 Freedom of expression  
 
Freedom of expression is a first generation human right.60  The concept of an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression goes back to the writings of Plato and 
Euripides.61  The birth of the right is a result of the sixteenth century reformation where 
Protestants protested and reclaimed the right to dissidence.62  The first document to 
state that individuals possessed a right to freedom of expression was the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.63  Freedom of expression was 
accepted as an individual’s right in countries around the world following the United 
States of America’s protection of the right in the first amendment of its Constitution in 
1791.64  Following WW2, freedom of expression was included in the lists of human 
rights; international and regional instruments included freedom of expression as one of 
                                                                  
58Taylor PM Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (2005) 1. See also Cerone J 
‘Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 357. 
59Taylor PM (2005) 3. 
60Jorgensen RF ‘The Right to Express Oneself and to Seek Information’ 2006 Human Rights in the Global 
Information Society 54. 
61 Magnuson W ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under 
International Law ’2010 The Vanderbilt University Law School Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 8. 
62Zoller E ‘An Ocean Apart? Freedom of Expression in Europe and the United States: Forward: Freedom of 
Expression: Precious Right in Europe, Sacred Right in the United States?’ 2009 Trustees of Indiana University 
Indiana Law Journal 803. 
63Magnuson W (2010) 277. 
64Magnuson W (2010) 277. 
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an individual’s basic human rights.65 
Freedom of expression is viewed and implemented differently in different countries and 
even though these differences exist, documents on an international level such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - and on a regional level - 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) have established a floor-level protection for freedom of 
expression.66  The basic understanding of the right is that individuals are guaranteed the 
right to seek and receive information and ideas as well as the right to impart or express 
information or ideas through media of their choice.67  The right to freedom of expression 
is a multifaceted right however it is tempered by permissible restrictions to protect 
national security, individual privacy and reputation, the impartiality of courts and the 
like.68  The above definition of freedom of expression will be used in this chapter 
because it represents the core agreement on a floor-level protection for freedom of 
expression. 
The right to freedom of expression is an important right in our society.  Without it we 
would not be able to achieve firstly democracy, as freedom of expression is an essential 
foundation for development of a democratic society which requires ‘pluralism of ideas 
and concepts about the world and life, about social organisations and about the 
relationship between members of society’.69  Secondly we would not be able to achieve 
personal autonomy; we are social beings and as such we need to receive ideas and 
information and to express, in any form, our own ideas and concepts in order to 
progress and develop.70 
The positive aspects freedom of expression brings to our society are tremendous; we 
can, with peace of mind and the confidence that the government will not interfere, speak 
                                                                  
65The international regulation of freedom of expression after WW2 will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2.1 
of chapter 3. See Magnuson W (2010) 277. 
66Wimmer K ‘Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of Expression’ (2006) 603 Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 202-216. 
67Commonwealth Secretariat Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association: Best Practice (2002) 9-10.  
68Commonwealth Secretariat (2002) 9-10. See also Wimmer K (2006) 202-216. 
69Licuta V ‘Right to Freedom of Expression and Its Regulation in National and International Legislation’ 2009 Acta 
Universitatis Danubius Juridica 103. 
70Jorgensen RF (2006) Society 53-54.  
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our mind, defend our opinions and communicate our ideas even though it may shock 
and disturb.  It represents the rise of the individual and our ability to act, think and break 
the shackles of a paternalistic society.71 
The term freedom of expression is used in this mini-thesis rather than the United States 
of America’s term of ‘freedom of speech’ a clarification of terms will now be addressed.  
Freedom of speech is cherished by Americans and protected in the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.72  The First Amendment does not contain the term 
‘freedom of expression’, instead it contains the terms ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom 
of the press’.73  Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are joined in American 
culture and in practice the court does not make a distinction between the two terms.  
When the First Amendment was adopted these terms meant immunity from remarks 
made in congress and a prohibition of censorship.74  The term ‘freedom of expression’ 
entered the American courts’ jurisprudence in the year 1941 for the purpose of limiting 
the effects of the common law rule of contempt of court which prohibited all commentary 
on trials in process.75  Today the term ‘freedom of speech’ has been given a broad 
construction by the American Supreme Court which includes the protection of freedom 
of expression.76  Even though the term ‘freedom of expression’ is used in the American 
Supreme Court opinions, the court prefers the term ‘freedom of speech’, perhaps 
because it is the exact language of the constitution.77 
The term ‘freedom of expression’ can be attributed to John Stuart who wrote an essay 
on liberty which showed that freedom of expression of opinion helped the well being of 
humanity.78  According to Van der Westhuizen, ‘freedom of expression includes 
utterances with some intelligible content intended to inform, ask or persuade’; it also 
                                                                  
71Zoller E (2009) 803. 
72The Constitution of the United States, 1787, first amendment states the following  ‘Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances’. 
73Seleoane M ‘Freedom of Expression: A Comparative Analysis’ 2002 Ecquid Novi 236. 
74Zoller E (2009) 803. 
75Zoller E (2009) 803. 
76Seleoane M (2002) 236.  
77Zoller E (2009) 803. 
78Zoller E (2009) 803. 
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includes ‘appeals to the emotion or the senses through sound, colour etc.’79  This mini-
thesis submits that freedom of expression includes speech. 
Based on the above examinations of the terms, it is submitted that the term ‘freedom of 
expression’ protects speech and the term ‘freedom of speech’ is given a broad 
construction which includes the protection of expression, therefore both terms are 
treated equally and it makes little difference which term we use.80 
Two decades ago freedom of expression was gaining ground around the world.  The 
Soviet empire was falling apart, there was a worldwide awareness of how important the 
struggle for freedom of expression was and pro democracy movements that challenged 
authoritarian regime were gaining ground.81  However, since the fatwa pronounced 
against Salman Rushdie, the 11 September attack, war on terror and the Danish 
Cartoon controversy, the freedom of expression movement finds itself in uncertain 
times.82 
2.3 Blasphemy and Islam 
 
The histories of these rights indicate limitations on these rights were imposed in order to 
protect an official or preferred point of view in order for the dominant voice or teaching 
to take preference.83  These rights have not been tension-free; in fact an open clash 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression is the prohibition of blasphemy, 
which is still an offence in many European democracies.84  A discussion on blasphemy 
and blasphemy in Islam is necessary in order to understand why most of the conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression stem from the religion of Islam. 
2.3.1 Blasphemy  
 
                                                                  
79Oosthuizen IJ & Russo C J ‘A Constitutionalised Perspective on Freedom of Artistic Expression’ (2001) 21 South 
African Journal of Education 260. 
80Seleoane M (2002) 236. 
81Kierulf A and Roning H (2009) 9. 
82Kierulf A and Roning H (2009) 9,139. 
83 Refer to section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 of chapter 2. 
84Uitz R ‘Constitutional Democracy Trapped Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: A Preface 
in Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and Freedom of Religion in a Fundamentalist World’ 2007 András Sajó 1-2. 
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According to Milton, blasphemy is, in its (non legal) essence, the ‘speaking evil of divine 
things’.  The legal definition of blasphemy, according to Skeen, is ‘blasphemy consists 
in the unlawful and intentional publication of words or conduct whereby God is 
slandered’.85 
The United Kingdom (UK) common law offence of blasphemy was officially abolished in 
May 2008.86  In January 2008 a spokesman for the Prime Minister - at the time Gordon 
Brown - stated that the abolition of blasphemy laws was being considered during the 
passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill.  Before making its decision the 
Government consulted with the Church of England and other churches and on the 
8 May 2008 the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 ended the common law 
offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales with effect from 
8 July 2008.87 
Until 2008 the UK still had old outdated blasphemy laws on its statute books.  The crime 
of blasphemy in the UK dates back to the seventeenth century.  It was one of the four 
branches of common law criminal libel in England; obscenity, defamation and sedition 
were the other branches.  These four branches were created to ensure that speech did 
not violate social norms for decency and propriety.88  The courts and the general public 
agreed that Christianity was central to the common law of England and should be 
recognized as such.89  The majority views were imposed at the expense of protecting 
the values of minority groups.  The common law crime of blasphemy was developed 
over centuries in England to protect the dignity and importance of Anglicanism, in 
particular, and Christianity in general.90 
The UK blasphemy laws only protected Christians and Christianity not Muslims and 
                                                                  
85Smith N ‘The Crime of Blasphemy and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights’ (1999) 116 South African Law 
Journal 162-164. 
86Temperman J ‘Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions and Human Rights law’ (2008) 26 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 519. 
87Crabtree V ‘Blasphemy Laws in the UK’ available at http://www.vexen.co.uk/religion/blasphemy.html (accessed 2 
May 2012). 
88Karlberg C ‘Freedom of Expression in the Modern Age: An Obscure Blasphemy Statute and its Effect on Business 
Naming’ (2009) 11 Rutgers Journal of law and Religion 275. 
89Karlberg C (2009) 275. 
90Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 2001). 
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Islam.  The Concise Law Dictionary states that blasphemy is only valid if it affects the 
Christian God, Jesus Christ, the Christian Bible or the Christian Book of Common 
Prayer.  Blasphemous libel occurs when hurtful literature or a ludicrous matter relating 
to Christian concepts is published.91 
Blasphemy has become of significant importance within the last 30 years.  The Salman 
Rushdie and Danish cartoon affairs brought attention to the nature, scope and 
application of the common law relating to blasphemy. It also demonstrated that 
blasphemy has become an essential factor in inter-religious relationships as well as 
bringing modern States to re-examine their religious and legislative past92 
The Salman Rushdie and Danish cartoon affairs will be discussed in greater detail 
below but first a discussion on blasphemy in Islam will take place.  The reason for 
discussing blasphemy in Islam is because Christians and Jews have not been offended 
by the Salman Rushdie and Danish cartoon affairs but Muslims, the followers of the 
Islamic religion, have taken offence, felt insulted and reacted towards these incidents.93 
2.3.2 Blasphemy in Islam  
 
Islam means peace and submission to God.94  Islam is based on the message and 
directives of God which were dictated to the Prophet Muhammad and laid out in the 
Quran.  Islamic societies follow the duties and obligations which God commands of man 
and believe that conformation to the word of God will create a just society.95  The 
Muslim community is open to all people who recognise Allah as God and the Prophet 
Muhammad as his final messenger regardless of their race, cast or class.  The 
foundation of Islam is a concept called tawhid which means the oneness of ALLAH, 
                                                                  
91Crabtree V ‘Blasphemy Laws in the UK’ available at http://www.vexen.co.uk/religion/blasphemy.html (accessed 2 
May 2012). 
92Nash D ‘Introduction: Blasphemy’ (2008) 32 Journal of Religious History 393.  
93Slaughter MM ‘The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honour and Freedom of Speech’ (1993) 79 Virginia Law 
Review 161. 
94Murata S and Chittick WC The Vision of Islam (1994) 3. 
95Islamic law has influenced the legal code in most Muslim counties. Islamic nations are connected to each other by 
its submission to Islamic practices and law, they form part of the house of Islam (dar al Islam) see Noori Y Legal 
and Political Structure of an Islamic State: Implications for Iran and Pakistan (1986). See also Johnson T ‘Islam 
Governing under Sharia’ available at http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034 (accessed 17 
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sura.  (Chapter) 112 of the Quran explains it and says ‘He is God, the One and Only; 
God, the Eternal, the Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten, and there is none 
like unto Him’.96  The nature and character of Islamic law is religious, it is believed to be 
based on divine inspiration and therefore it is the sacred law of all Muslims.97 
Freedom of religion in the Islamic context states that non-Muslims are not obliged to 
convert to Islam, nor are they denied from practising their own religious rites.98  Muslims 
and non-Muslims are entitled to spread the religion of their following and also to defend 
their religion against attack or provocation regardless of whether such an action is 
launched by people of their own faith or others.99 
Islam supports freedom of expression but places certain restrictions on it.100  Islam 
embraces freedom of expression and positive evidence of the existence of this right in 
Islam are the following: 
1) Hisbah - commanding the good and forbidding evil. 
2) Nasihah - the giving of sincere advice. 
3) Shura - consultation. 
4) Ijtihad – personal reasoning. 
5) Freedom to criticise.  
6) Freedom to express an opinion. 
7) Freedom of religion.101 
In Islam moral and legal limitations are placed on the exercise of freedom of expression.  
Honour and dignity of the individual is central to Islam therefore telling lies, back-biting, 
                                                                  
96Saloom R ‘You Dropped a Bomb on Me Denmark: A Legal Examination of the Cartoon Controversy and 
Response as it Relates to the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic law’ (2006) 8 Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 
10. 
97Noori Y (1986)12. 
98Kamali MH Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997) 7. 
99Kamali MH (1997) 7. 
100Kamali MH (1997) 8. 
101Goolam N (2006) 342. 
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ridiculing others and exposing the weakness of others are moral violations of freedom of 
expression.102  Islam denounces the spreading of lies and false stories and if the truth 
should be spoken and you remain passive and reluctant, it is condemned.103  The 
spreading of lies, back-biting, ridiculing and exposing the weakness of others is 
discouraged by Islam because it infringes on the basic right to freedom as a human 
being.104  In Islam every individual must think well of others.105 
Legally, freedom of expression should not be hurtful to others and should not violate 
their right to dignity.106  The following types of speech would violate Sharia: 
1) public utterance of hurtful speech; 
2) slanderous accusation; 
3) blasphemy; 
4) sedition; 
5) insult; 
6) cursing; 
7) attribution of lies.107 
This mini-thesis submits that in the Islamic vocabulary many words overlap with the 
word blasphemy in the Christian tradition.  The Arabic word tajd_f would be the word 
used to describe blasphemy in the Christian tradition; the word tajd_f means scoffing at 
Gods bounty.108  There are other words used that overlap with the English word of 
blasphemy, for example kufr which means unbelief, ridda which means apostasy, fisq 
which means moral depravity, ilh_d which means heresy, sabba which means to abuse, 
                                                                  
102Goolam N (2006) 342. 
103Madani AH ‘Freedom and its Concept in Islam’ (2011) 17 International Conference on Humanities, Historical 
and Social Sciences 119. 
104Madani AH (2011) 119. 
105Madani AH (2011) 119. 
106Goolam N (2006) 342. 
107Kamali MH (1997) 166. 
108Asad T ‘Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism’ available at 
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insult and shatama which means to abuse, vilify.109  In response to the Danish cartoons, 
the word used by the World Union of Muslim Scholars in its statement on the cartoons 
were is _’ah which means insult, harm and offence.110 
Blasphemy, which is one of the types of speech which violates Sharia (Islamic law), 
consists of insulting of Allah (God), the Prophet Muhammad and making a 
contemptuous statement which outrages the religious sensitivities of believers for 
example, attacking the fundamentals of the Islamic religion.  Insulting the prophet can 
be explicit which means attacking his personal integrity, or implicit by mockery or 
disrespect.111  In essence, blasphemy in Islamic law falls under two categories: (1) 
zindiqa and (2) sabb al-rasul.  In zindiqa, if your public expression of free-thinking, 
atheism or heresy is regarded as scandalous and menacing, it is blasphemy.  Sabb al-
rasul means insult of the Prophet and is considered blasphemy.112 
In Islam, apostasy is based on sedition.  An apostate, in terms of the Quran, is inspired 
by Satan and treated as having committed treason against the Islamic state and the 
social order.113  An apostate would contribute to social disorder because he would be 
challenging the accepted norms and beliefs.114  Apostasy in Islam overlaps with 
blasphemy because conduct that would constitute blasphemy could also constitute 
apostasy.  There are many differences of opinion regarding whether an act constitutes 
apostasy but traditionally an individual would commit apostasy if he commits the 
following acts: denying Gods divinity, denying that Muhammad is a Prophet, rejection of 
the authenticity of the Quran and the rejection of the Sharia courts.115  There are 
differences of opinion regarding the punishment for apostasy, however the death 
penalty as a punishment is based on content of the Quran which states that: 
Those that make war against God and his apostle and spread disorder in the land shall 
                                                                  
109Kamali MH (1997) 166. 
110Asad T ‘Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism’ available at 
http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/pubs/ASAD.pdf (accessed 22 May 2012). 
111Goolam N (2006) 343. 
112 Chase A ‘Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights Law, and the Salman Rushdie Affair’ 
(1996) 11 American University International Law Review 399. 
113Sedition definition: Conduct or language inciting rebellion against the authority of a state available at 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sedition (accessed 5 June 2012). See also Slaughter MM (1993) 177. 
114Slaughter MM (1993) 177. 
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be put to death or crucified or have their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides, or be 
banished.116 
Salman Rushdie was also sued by British Muslims in the English Court; the charges 
were blasphemy and sedition.  The Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court found that 
Salman Rushdie was not guilty of seditious libel and blasphemous libel as this only 
applied to attacks on the Christian religion.117 
In Islam, as referred to in section 1.1 of chapter 1, speech which is insulting to God 
would constitute blasphemy, however in Muslim history blasphemy became associated 
mainly with perceived insults to the Prophet Muhammad.118  By the third Islamic century 
speaking against the Prophet Muhammad was an unlawful act within the Muslim 
community and at the start of the fourth Islamic century it was decided that insults to the 
Prophet Muhammad shall be punishable by death.119  According to Isḥāq Islamic law is 
more severe with regard to insulting and reviling of the Prophet Muhammad than 
towards the reviling and insult of God.120 
There is a tradition under Sharia that you are not to draw the Prophet and this can be 
linked to the prohibition of idol worship discussed in the Quran.121  There is a hadith 
which states that when the Prophet entered Mecca he saw pictures of the Prophet 
Abraham and Mary practicing divination of arrows on the Kabba which were placed 
there by the Quarash (enemies of Islam) and the Prophet refused to enter the Kabba 
until it was removed. The Prophet Muhammad stated that angels do not enter a house 
in which there are pictures, and cursed the Quarash for depicting Abraham as practicing 
divination by arrows which was not true.122  This mini- thesis submits that based on the 
hadith a drawing of the Prophet may be seen as idol worship, which is prohibited in 
                                                                  
116Dawood NJ The Koran (1990) 33-34. 
117Regina v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury, [1990] 3 WLR 
986. 
118Isḥāq I,  Ṣaḥīḥ B ‘Blasphemy in Islam ‘available at http://quranandinjil.org/pdfs/Blasphemy-in-Islam.pdf 
(accessed 17 May 2012). 
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Islam. 
Muslims have to accept all commandments, rules and values as they are Allah’s rules; 
this is a big reason why Muslims cannot agree with Western law.  For example, the fact 
that the ECHR protects speech that offends, shocks or disturbs the state or any sector 
of the population would not be consistent with Sharia.123  It is submitted by this mini-
thesis that based on the Islamic understanding of blasphemy the Salman Rushdie affair 
and the Danish cartoon controversy would constitute blasphemy. 
2.4 The Salman Rushdie Affair 
 
As mentioned in section 2.1 of chapter 2, the Salman Rushdie affair illustrates the 
conflict between freedom of religion (Islamic religion) and freedom of expression; one of 
the elements present in this affair is blasphemy.  A brief summary of the facts of the 
Salman Rushdie affair will be stated in order to understand the reaction to it.  In 1988 
Salman Rushdie published a book called The Satanic Verses.124  The post modern 
satirical style novel stimulated controversy and was regarded as blasphemous, 
insulting, offensive and defamatory by Muslims globally, however in the western 
community it was regarded as freedom of expression and has won numerous prizes 
and awards .125 
The book contains defamatory passages about the Prophet Muhammad, his 
companions and wives and it also contains parts which are scornful to the Quran and 
the principles of Islam.126  There are several parts in this book which Muslims found 
defamatory and blasphemous.  The blasphemous episodes in the book will be stated.127 
Blasphemous episodes: 
                                                                  
123Landscheidt D ‘The Conflict between Western World and Islam’ available at 
http://www.landscheidt.com/The%20Islam.pdf (accessed 20 May 2012). 
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1) The first episode is the meaning of the title The Satanic Verses which refers to a time 
in the Prophet Muhammad’s life.128  Tabari, a tenth century historian, explains that when 
the Prophet Muhammad received the message of God he started to convert groups to 
the religion of Islam and one of the groups he wanted to convert was the polytheistic 
tribes of Mecca who worshipped three female deities.129  When the Prophet Muhammad 
recited the message of God to these groups, Satan caused him to say that these 
goddesses are ‘exalted birds’ - this would mean that the goddesses are equal to Allah.  
Angel Gibreel then told Prophet Muhammad that these words were not the words of 
Allah, Allah then abrogated these verses and replaced them with verses that indicate 
that Muslims should not worship idols and that the other passages were the words of 
Satan.130  Rushdie’s use of The Satanic Verses challenges the divine origin of the 
Quran and Islam as Gods words.  In the novel Salman Rushdie writes that Mahound 
(the Prophet Muhammad in the novel), in order to advance his religion, speaks the 
satanic verses through Gibreel but then repents and erases them again through 
Gibreel.131  This is an indication that Mahound and not Allah makes Gibreel speak and 
this implies that Islam is built on errors and the Quran is a fiction.132 
2) The second episode is that of Salman the Persian, who undermines the legitimacy of 
the Quran.  In the novel Salman was the first Persian to convert to Islam and one of the 
Transcribers of the Quran he tested the legitimacy of Mahound's revelations by making 
his own changes to the text and Mahound failed to notice.133 
3) The third episode is where Salman Rushdie shows specific laws as Mahound’s petty 
obsessions instead of laws prescribed by God for leading a just life.134 
These three episodes were contested by Muslims on the basis that Salman Rushdie 
was asserting false claims about Islam and therefore it was considered as 
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blasphemous.135 
Muslim authors put their feelings into words.  Baddawi states that the Novel was like ‘a 
knife being dug into you - or being raped yourself’.136  Sardar and Davies stated that ‘it 
is as though he has personally assaulted and raped every single believing Muslim man 
and women’.137  Muzuri stated that ‘It’s as if he has composed a brilliant poem about the 
private parts of his parents, and then gone to the market place to recite that poem to the 
applause of strangers’.138  Richard Webster’s novel stated that ‘Islam is the victim not 
simply of criticism and satire but an act of cultural rape’.139 
2.4.1 The reaction to the Novel 
 
Responses to the novel took the form of banning of the novel, mass demonstrations, 
and the most extreme reaction being Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa (religious sentence).140  
The Indian finance ministry was the first to ban the novel on 5 October 1988 and 
countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Sudan also placed 
their own bans on it.141  In December 1988 the Islamic defence council held a protest 
rally.142  On 14 January 1989 Muslims in England Bradford burned copies of the novel in 
public.143  Fire bombings at bookstores that carried The Satanic Verses in Berkeley, 
California took place, and a New York newspaper that supported Rushdie also suffered 
fire bombings.144  In February 1989, five people were killed in Islamabad in a riot 
protesting the book.145 
On 14 February 1989 Ayatollah Khomeni, Iran’s spiritual leader, put a fatwa on Tehran 
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radio sentencing Salman Rushdie and all involved in the publication of the novel to 
death.  Ayatollah Khomeini declared Salman Rushdie guilty of apostasy and stated that 
all ‘zealous Muslims’ should kill Salman Rushdie and his publishers and offered a $3 
million reward to anyone who would carry out the fatwa.146 
Following the fatwa, Rushdie’s interpreters felt the brunt; his Japanese translator was 
stabbed to death, his Italian translator was stabbed and seriously injured, his Norwegian 
publisher was shot and severely injured and 37 people were killed when a Turkish hotel 
was burned in protest against Rushdie’s Turkish translator.147 
Rushdie was also sued by British Muslims in the English Court; the charges were 
blasphemy and sedition.  The Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court found that 
Rushdie was not guilty of seditious libel and blasphemous libel as this only applied to 
attacks on the Christian religion.148 
As a result of the Salman Rushdie affair Muslims received much more attention in the 
media, which portrayed them as unable to adapt to western society.149  The term ‘west’ 
would refer to Europe and lands of significant European settlement such as North 
America.150  The west is viewed as the colonial and post-colonial European and 
American global pre-eminence.151  The west compared Muslims to Nazis who burned 
libraries and harassed intellectuals.152  The burning of the novel was proof to the west 
that Muslims were ‘barbarians, fanatics, ignorant, blood thirsty bigots and medieval 
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fundamentalist’.153  There was a feeling that the Muslims’ reaction to the novel was 
irrational and that they exposed themselves as enemies of free thought.154 
2.4.2 Concluding remarks on the Salman Rushdie affair 
 
The Salman Rushdie affair indicates a disagreement between Islam and the west.  
These orders have co-existed for many years however the potential for eruption 
between these orders is always present and the conflict in most instances would be 
between a religious natural law order and the positive, secular international order.155  
This conflict between Islam and the west stems from each order’s commitment to 
incompatible world views: Islam is God centred while the west are irreligious and focus 
on individualism and self fulfilment.156  This mini-thesis submits that there are two 
competing rights in the Salman Rushdie affair namely freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion and there are different arguments in favour of each of these rights.  
The argument in favour of freedom of religion is that strongly held religious convictions 
should trump freedom of expression, particularly if issues of multi-culturalism and anti-
racism are involved.157  There are limitations on freedom of speech; this right should not 
be exercised at the expense of the rights of others nor should it be used to justify 
blasphemy against Islam according to the Organisation of Islamic Conference who 
stated that Rushdie’s Book violates freedom of expression.158  This mini-thesis submits 
that the essence of this argument is that although The Satanic Verses is a form of 
expression, it oversteps the boundaries of freedom of expression by infringing on 
another’s right to freedom of religion. 
The arguments in favour of freedom of expression are that the Militant Islamic rights 
should not dictate what people can read, write, print, distribute and display.  It is also 
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argued that ‘to punish a man for his religious thoughts is one of the most abhorrent of 
crimes’.159  The reason that freedom of expression should take preference is because 
free speech is a constitutive institution and a constitutive of democracy and without it 
democracy cannot go forward.  It is further argued that religious beliefs are not essential 
to democracy and therefore free speech should take precedence.160 
Blasphemy is a common law offence which only protects the Christian religion.161  The 
Salman Rushdie affair confirmed that blasphemy laws only extended to beliefs of 
Christianity.  The Satanic Verses focussed on ambivalent religion, doubt and moral 
deliberation.  Muslims were outraged and felt the novel was offensive and 
blasphemous.162  Rushdie’s freedom of expression remained intact as The Satanic 
Verses book could not be prosecuted for blasphemy against Islam because the religion 
of Islam fell outside the scope of Blasphemy.163 
2.5 The Danish Cartoon Controversy 
 
The Danish cartoon controversy started with Danish writer Kaare Bluitgen who was 
writing a children’s book called ‘The life of the Prophet Muhammad’.164  He was of the 
view that a better understanding of Islam would encourage tolerance in Danish 
children.165  Finding an illustrator was difficult for him, he approached three illustrators 
who turned him down.  Finally an illustrator agreed to do it anonymously.166  As referred 
to in section 1.1 of chapter 1, on 30 September 2005 Jyllands-Posten published an 
article called the ‘Face of Muhammad’; this article was about self-censorship and the 
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fear of Muslim backlash; it contained 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet.167 
In essence, the printing of these cartoons was a stand for the right to express yourself 
without self-censorship and the fear of a backlash for what you have expressed.168  It is 
ironic that a huge backlash occurred.  Muslims called these cartoons ‘despicable 
racism’ and ‘revolting.169  The cartoons sparked a reaction from Muslims across the 
world, they protested and marched, burned Danish flags and embassies, boycotted 
Danish products and all media that exhibited the cartoons; damage to property and loss 
of lives was a result of this reaction.170  Drawing the Prophet Muhammad is prohibited in 
Islam as it is seen as Idol worship and idol worship goes against the Islamic principle 
that there is only one God.171 
Denmark’s response to the printing of the cartoons was that the Danish government 
was not taking a stance on the cartoons as there was a free press in Denmark and only 
the courts could judge whether the cartons broke the law.172 
2.5.1 Denmark’s failure to prosecute 
 
On 12 October 2005 in response to the Danish cartoons, ambassadors of eleven 
Muslim majority countries requested a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister but it was 
refused on the following grounds: 
Freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish Government has no means of 
influencing the press.  However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of 
opinion of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature.  The offended party may bring court 
proceedings against the authors of such acts or expressions of opinion, and it is for the 
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courts to decide in individual cases.173 
On 29 October 2005 several Muslim associations took the editors to court for offending 
followers of Islam and based their argument on article 140 and 266b of the Danish 
Penal Code.174 
Section 140 of the Danish Penal Code states that: 
Any person who, in public, mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of worship of 
any lawfully existing religious community in this country shall be liable to imprisonment 
for any term not exceeding four months.175 
Section 266b of the Danish Penal code states that: 
Any person who publicly or with the intention of wider dissemination, makes a statement 
or imparts other information by which a group of people are threatened, scorned or 
degraded on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual 
inclination shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two 
years.176 
Jyllands-Posten claimed that the cartoon was an exercise of free speech and that it was 
incompatible with the right to freedom of expression to demand special consideration for 
religious feelings and that one has to be ready to put up with ‘scorn, mockery and 
ridicule’.177 
The Regional Public Prosecutor for Vibor found that there were no grounds for 
considering the publication of the cartoons to be a violation of section 140 or 266b of the 
Danish Penal Code and this resulted in complaints to the Director of Public Prosecution 
who also found insufficient grounds to attach criminal liability and dismissed the 
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complaints.178  One of the Director of Public Prosecution’s arguments for not 
prosecuting is that Jyllands-Posten had no intention of provocation but wanted to 
promote a public debate, which is not unusual in Denmark, on freedom of expression in 
relation to religion and religious feelings.179 
Section 140 of the Danish Penal Code prohibits blasphemy and protects the religious 
feelings of all lawfully existing religious communities not just those of Christians, as in 
the UK, against mockery and scorn by prohibiting public ridiculing or insult of the 
dogmas of worship.180  Section 266b protects groups of persons against scorn and 
degradation on account of their religion.  This section protects religion and does not 
include a firm reference to a religious group.181  This mini-thesis submits that based on 
these sections there is no free and unrestricted right to express opinions about religious 
subjects if expression falls within these rules, and the Danish cartoons fell within the 
scope of Section 140 and 266b of the Danish Penal code and the Government should 
have enforced the Code and prosecuted.   
The cartoon controversy started in Denmark and spread throughout Europe and the 
world sparking debate and causing split opinions.  There was support for freedom of 
expression as a fundamental freedom on the one side and support for freedom of 
religion, claiming that freedom of expression carried with it a responsibility to depict all 
religious beliefs and groups in an inoffensive way, on the other.182  The factors which 
would possibly influence a country and its people’s opinions on the Danish cartoon 
controversy with regard to which argument they would favour are the different societal 
and political understandings of these two rights, the perceptions of the key values of a 
country, a countries historical experiences and the religious composition of the country’s 
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population.183 
2.5.2 Concluding remarks on the Danish cartoon controversy 
 
In the Danish cartoon controversy, the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression are in conflict and parties such as the followers of Islam and certain counties 
in the west have stood up for their beliefs.  This is understandable given the different 
cultures and understanding of these rights under International law as well as the 
different understanding of autonomy.184  It is submitted by this mini-thesis that Islamic 
law and International norms are compatible but the Quran contains express 
contradictions to human rights law which lead to conflict and confrontation.  In Islamic 
law, freedom of expression is an obligation on the right holder to speak the truth, not on 
others.  Islam puts society above the individual whereas human rights ideals protect the 
individual’s ultimate worth.185  The conflict arises because Islam emphasizes duties not 
individual rights and human rights law focuses on the individual as the key unit of 
society.186 
According to Powers, Rose used the cartoons as a fight for freedom of expression by 
arguing that freedom of expression in Europe is being undermined by the atmosphere of 
fear and intimidation created by Islamic extremist.187.  Rose wanted to ignite a cultural 
battle between defenders of a particular conception of western free speech principles 
and the Muslims’ conception of free speech in the hope that the western enlightenment 
values would triumph.188 
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In order to resolve the conflict caused by the Danish cartoons, the United Nations (UN) 
got involved.  The UN special rapporteur stated that these cartoons were one of the 
most severe examples of hatred for Islam, stating that the Danish government’s 
handling of the matter revealed trivialization of Islamaphobia at the political level.189  In 
1999 a resolution called Defamation of Religions was introduced in the UN for the first 
time in order to prevent negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of 
intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief and to prevent defamation 
of religions.  Similar resolutions were adopted in the following years.190  In 2006 after 
the cartoons were published, defamation of religions became a topic of debate in the 
UN General Assembly.191  The supporters of the resolution were mostly Muslim 
countries stating that the resolution provide a platform for tolerance and respect of all 
the religions.192  The opponents of the resolution were the west who argued firstly that 
although the resolution states that defamation of all religions should be combated, it 
emphasises the position of the Islamic religion; and secondly that Islamic countries were 
using the resolution to protect the rights of the majority religion at the expense of the 
rights of religious minorities.193  This mini-thesis submits that in order to resolve the 
conflict caused by the Danish cartoons, the UN implemented a resolution called 
Defamation of Religions however, the conflicting traditions, cultures and religion 
between Islam and the west has resulted in an ongoing debate over the purpose and 
content of the resolution. 
This mini-thesis submits that in the Salman Rushdie affair nothing indicates that the 
conflict has been resolved and no guidelines exist in assisting in solving the conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression. The Danish cartoon 
controversy has not provided us with a clear solution to solve the conflict between 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression.  Instead it has indicated that the core of 
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the problem lies in the conflicting tradition, culture and religion of Islam and the west.  
This mini-thesis therefore suggests that one solution to resolving the conflict between 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression is to address the relationship between 
Islam and the west.  Further suggestion on how to address the relationship is discussed 
in section 5.3 of chapter 5.194 
The Salman Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoon controversy has not provided us with 
guidance on how to deal with the conflict of rights; this min-thesis will now discuss 
selected theories on the conflict of rights in order to address this issue.195 
2.6 Habermas’ Theory on solving conflicts 
 
Habermas’ approach to dealing with a conflict of rights is to deny that any balancing 
between constitutional rights should be done, Habermas states that balancing 
constitutional rights deprives them of their normative powers.196  Constitutional 
provisions should be regarded as legal norms and principles and according to 
Habermas, when balancing rights it is downgraded to the levels of goals, policies and 
values.197  Habermas rejects any balancing of constitutional rights to solve a conflict.  
Instead ‘he conceives constitutional review as a type of application discourse, seeking 
an impartial application of already justified higher level constitutional norms to legal 
norms’.198  Habermas indicates that constitutional courts should examine the prima facie 
applicable norms in order to find out which one is most suitable to the case at hand  
Essentially what he is saying is that one should clarify the context so that only one 
constitutional right applies.199 
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Harbemas’ theory is a relevant option which can be used to solve the conflict between 
freedom of expression and religion as it teaches us about the co-originality of the rights 
to popular sovereignty and to human rights however, since he denies that any balancing 
between constitutional rights should take place, his theory does not point out how 
constitutional courts should solve a concrete conflict of human rights.200  Furthermore, 
by stating that courts should adjudicate by using an application discourse i.e. clarifying 
the context so that only one norm can be applicable, Habermas denies the role of every 
lawyer and judge.201 
2.7 Konrad Hesse’s notion on PraktischeKkonkordanz 
 
In Germany, the Constitutional Courts’ approach to reconciling conflicting constitutional 
rights is to apply the principle of PraktischeKkonkordanz (Practical Concordance).202  
Hesse submits that rights and interests guaranteed by the Constitution must be related 
to one another in such a way that each of them can be put into effect.203  Hesse further 
submits that in the case of conflicting rights, none of them must be implemented at the 
expense of the other, nor by hastily balancing the underlying values on the basis of 
abstract considerations.204  Conflicting rights and interests must be subject to limitations 
so that each one attains its optimal effect.  Consequently, limitations have to be 
proportionate in light of the specific circumstances.205  They must not be broader than 
required to establish a concordance of conflicting constitutional values.206 
Essentially what Practical Concordance does is it harmonizes and balances conflicting 
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constitutional rights so that each is preserved in creative tension with one another.207  
Practical Concordance is an interpretive tool and is primarily applied to rights which lack 
an explicit limitations clause; it offers a general approach and provides case specific 
solutions due to its underlying objective, which is the preservation of the unity of the 
constitution.208  Practical Concordance regards all ‘constitutional rights and values 
involved as being of equal value and rank, enabling the courts to give preference to one 
of them according to the specifics of the case under consideration’.209 
Practical Concordance is very similar to the South African approach as referred to in 
section 4.4.2 in chapter 4 to solving conflicts, and would fit into its framework as there is 
no hierarchy of rights under the South African Constitution.  The requirements for 
Practical Concordance to be successful in a system is that the ‘constitutional and 
human rights system under consideration considers all rights included as being of equal 
validity and rank and only if there are no specific limitation clauses addressing such 
conflicts between rights of equal validity’.210  If the requirements are met, Practical 
Concordance will preserve the unity of the instrument and provide guidance to case 
specific answers to conflicting rights. 
In theory this approach to solving problems is very impressive however in practice the 
German Constitutional Court, in balancing and harmonizing conflicting constitutional 
rights, has created a de facto hierarchy of rights and as a result of this the jurisprudence 
                                                                  
207Banks TL ‘Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some’ available 
athttp://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=fac_pubs&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.co.za%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dcompeting%252
0constitutional%2520rights%253A%2520raising%2520some%2520questions%2520%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3
D2%26ved%3D0CDkQFjAB%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu%252Fcgi%
252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1634%2526context%253Dfac_pubs%26ei%3DNqW_UNTDNIi3hAe53IC
QBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHPD_cUCEiJp32iWRMox_yxCB3h9g#search=%22competing%20constitutional%20rig
hts%3A%20raising%20some%20questions%22 (accessed 5 December 2012). 
208Marauhn T & Ruppel N ‘Balancing Conflicting  Human Rights Konrad Hesse’s Notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz and the German Federal Constitutional Court’ in Brems E Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights (2008) 296. 
209Marauhn T & Ruppel N ‘Balancing Conflicting  Human Rights Konrad Hesse’s Notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz and the German Federal Constitutional Court’ in Brems E Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights (2008) 296. 
210Marauhn T & Ruppel N ‘Balancing Conflicting  Human Rights Konrad Hesse’s Notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz and the German Federal Constitutional Court’ in Brems E Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights (2008) 296. 
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of the court is inconsistent and unpredictable.211  Sometimes the court jurisprudence 
rests on rigorous analysis and other times it rests on bewildering ex cathedra 
pronouncements.212 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has laid the foundation of the conflict between freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression by discussing the historical and philosophical aspects of these 
rights.  Blasphemy in general and blasphemy in Islam was discussed and it was 
established that insults to the Prophet Muhammad is considered to be blasphemous 
under the Islamic religion.  It has further been established that the reason why most of 
the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression stem from the 
religion of Islam is because Muslims have to accept all commandments, rules and 
values as they are Allah’s rules - this is a big reason why Muslims cannot agree with 
western law.  
In order to determine how to deal with the conflict between freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression this chapter discussed the Salman Rushdie affair and the Danish 
cartoon controversy.  These incidences provided little guidance on how to deal with a 
conflict of rights.  Rushdie and The Satanic Verses book could not be prosecuted for 
blasphemy against Islam because the religion of Islam fell outside the scope of 
blasphemy in the United Kingdom.  In order to resolve the conflict caused by the Danish 
                                                                  
211Banks TL ‘Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some’ available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=fac_pubs&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.co.za%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dcompeting%252
0constitutional%2520rights%253A%2520raising%2520some%2520questions%2520%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3
D2%26ved%3D0CDkQFjAB%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu%252Fcgi%
252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1634%2526context%253Dfac_pubs%26ei%3DNqW_UNTDNIi3hAe53IC
QBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHPD_cUCEiJp32iWRMox_yxCB3h9g#search=%22competing%20constitutional%20rig
hts%3A%20raising%20some%20questions%22 (accessed 5 December 2012). 
212Banks TL ‘Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some’ available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=fac_pubs&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.co.za%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dcompeting%252
0constitutional%2520rights%253A%2520raising%2520some%2520questions%2520%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3
D2%26ved%3D0CDkQFjAB%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu%252Fcgi%
252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1634%2526context%253Dfac_pubs%26ei%3DNqW_UNTDNIi3hAe53IC
QBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHPD_cUCEiJp32iWRMox_yxCB3h9g#search=%22competing%20constitutional%20rig
hts%3A%20raising%20some%20questions%22 (accessed 5 December 2012). 
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cartoons the UN implemented a resolution called Defamation of Religions, however the 
conflicting traditions, cultures and religions between Islam and the west have resulted in 
an ongoing debate over the purpose and content of the resolution.  Although the Danish 
cartoon controversy did not provide us with guidance on how to deal with the conflict 
between the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression, it was established 
that the core of the problem lies in the conflicting tradition, culture and religion of Islam 
and the west. 
In order to provide us with guidance on how to deal with the conflict of rights, this min-
thesis discussed Habermas’ theory on solving conflicts and Konrad Hesse’s notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz, and although both theories provide guidance on solving 
conflicts of rights this mini-thesis has established flaws in both these theories. 
To further the discussion on conflict of rights and how to solve the conflict between the 
right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression this mini-thesis will determine 
whether these rights conflict under international human rights law and how a conflict of 
these rights would be solved under International human rights law. 
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Chapter Three 
The conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
under international human rights law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Every individual has human rights which are designed to protect them from unwarranted 
interferences in crucial aspects of their lives; human rights can only be limited when 
strict requirements of necessity and proportionality are met.213  When two or more 
human rights conflict, the principle of indivisibility of human rights requires that both 
rights carry equal weight - one right cannot trump the other and therefore alternative 
means must be used to resolve the conflict.214  The definition of a conflict is: 
A strong disagreement or collision of values needs, interests, or intentions among 
individuals, groups, organisations, communities or nations.215 
As indicated in section 1.1 of chapter 1, according to Zucca: 
In order for there to be a conflict between rights, one norm must make it permissible to 
do X and the other norm must deny the permission to do X meaning that the actions 
allowed by both rights are not jointly performable.216 
Zucca’s definition of a conflict of rights will be employed by this mini-thesis. 
After World War Two (WW2) international treaties, resolutions and declarations aimed 
at protecting human rights were created.  Brysk states that the purpose of developing 
                                                                  
213Smet S ‘Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human rights in Conflict’ available at 
http://www.auilr.org/pdf/26/26.1.8.pdf (accessed 23 November 2011). 
214Smet S ‘Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human rights in Conflict’ available 
athttp://www.auilr.org/pdf/26/26.1.8.pdf (accessed 23 November 2011). 
215Hovatter D ‘Understanding Conflicts and Disagreements’ available at 
http://www.wvu.edu/~exten/infores/pubs/fypubs/wlg353.pdf (accessed 23 November 2011). 
216Zucca L (2007) 50. The Dictionary definition of a conflict is ‘to come into collision or disagreement; be 
contradictory, at variance, or in opposition; clash: incompatibility or interference, as of one idea, desire, event, or 
activity with another’, the definition is available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/conflict (accessed 23 
November 2011). 
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international human rights following WW2 was to create ‘a set of universal claims to 
safeguard human dignity from illegitimate coercion enacted by state agents’.217  
International human rights laws set out obligations and States are bound to respect 
these obligations when they become a party to an International treaty.218  The 
obligations and duties a State becomes bound to once they become a party to a treaty 
are to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.219  These obligations require a State to 
refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights, to protect 
individuals and groups against human rights abuses and to take positive action to 
facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.220  To comply with the obligations, 
domestic measures are developed and implemented by Governments.221 
A customary rule of law comes into being when a state ratifies a codifying treaty.  When 
a state ratifies or accedes to a treaty that claims a rule of law the state accepts the rule 
of the treaty as legally binding upon it.222  It is argued that freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion are general norms of customary international law.223  A mode of 
behaviour or form of conduct becomes a customary rule of international law through: 
1) The continuous practice of states. 
2) The act or usage must be adhered to by an overwhelming majority of states in the 
international community. 
3) The element of opinion jurissive necessitates must be present. 
4) The states adhering to the usage must recognise it as a rule of law that creates a 
binding legal obligation. 
                                                                  
217Merry SE ‘The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and Local’ available at 
http://humanrights.uconn.edu/documents/papers/MarkGoodaleHumanRights.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011). 
218United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘International Human Rights 
Law’ available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (accessed 25 
November 2011). 
219United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘International Human Rights 
Law’ available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (accessed 25 
November 2011). 
220United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘International Human Rights 
Law’ available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (accessed 25 
November 2011). 
221United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘International Human Rights 
Law’ available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (accessed 25 
November 2011). 
222Jones TD Human Rights: Group Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Law of Nations (1998) 37. 
223Jones TD (1998) 37. 
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5) The practice must be viewed as more than a norm of international courtesy abided 
by out of a sense of comity. 
6) Time is also a determinate of whether a norm becomes a customary rule of 
international law.224 
 
This mini-thesis submits that the right to freedom of expression is an established norm 
of customary international law.  It is guaranteed and protected under various 
international and regional instruments; it is also inscribed in most constitutions of the 
world.225  Virtually all countries of the world regard freedom of expression as innate, 
instinctive, primordial and imprescriptible.226  This mini-thesis further submits that 
freedom of religion is also a well established norm of customary international law and as 
an international norm, freedom of religion protects religious and non-religious beliefs, 
private religion and belief and the freedom to express belief by peaceful means, and it is 
one of the core protections of the international human rights system.227 
 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to determine whether the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression are in conflict with each other under International 
Human Rights law and secondly to determine how a conflict between the right to 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression would be resolved under international 
human rights law.  International and Regional instruments will be discussed in order to 
make these determinations. 
 
3.2 International regulation of the right to freedom of religion and the 
right to freedom of expression 
 
                                                                  
224Jones TD (1998) 37. 
225Asoka K ‘Right to Freedom of Expression: Human Rights Defenders Briefing Papers and Series’ 2009 
International Service for Human Rights 4.  
226Jones TD (1998) 37. 
227United States District Court ‘Affidavit of International Law Professors and Religious Freedom Experts Regarding 
the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief’ available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/US/LiuQi_Affidavit_ReligionFreedomExperts_3-7-2002.pdf (accessed 
10 December 2011). 
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The right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression is contained in various 
International and regional instruments.  Unfortunately discussing all the international 
instrument which contain the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression is 
beyond the scope of this mini-thesis.228  The mini-thesis will be discussing the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because it is a binding 
covenant.229  Even though the ICCPR is only binding on signatory countries, more than 
three quarters of the UN’s member States are bound by the ICCPR under treaty law. It 
could be argued that all nations, regardless if they signed the covenant or not, may be 
bound by the ICCPR under customary International law.230  Furthermore, the ICCPR 
stems from Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  The UDHR sets out 
individuals’ basic civil and political rights.231  The UDHR is a non-binding document 
which has had a great impact on international human rights law as all treaties adopted 
by the UN since 1948 has been elaborations of the UDHR.232  Commentators have 
stated that the UDHR has become part of the common law of the world’s community 
and is superior to all international instruments and domestic law.233 
The ICCPR is an elaboration of the UDHR; both the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression are protected under the UDHR and the ICCPR under article 18 
and 19.234  The ICCPR elaborates more fully on the provisions of freedom of religion 
and freedom of expression and in order to prevent repetition, the relationship between 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion under the ICCPR will be discussed.  
                                                                  
228The International human rights framework according to Steiner and Alston can be split up into four groups (1) the 
United Nations Charter, (2) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (3) the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and (4) multilateral human rights treaties at the international and regional level 
see Steiner H and Alston P International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals 2 ed (2000) 137-138. 
Discussing all the international and regional instruments is beyond the scope of this mini-thesis which will focus on 
the ICCPR under international treaties and the ECHR under regional treaties. 
229Magnuson W (2010) 8. 
230Clarke B ‘Freedom of Speech and Criticism of Religion: What are the Limits?’ (2007) 14 Murdoch University E 
Law Journal 103. 
231International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Preamble. 
232Coliver S ‘The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook’ available at 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/1993-handbook.pdf (accessed 24 November 2011). 
233Magnuson W (2010) 8. 
234Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III). 
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3.2.1 The right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression under the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
 
As referred to in section 3.2 of chapter 3, the right to freedom of religion is contained 
under article 18 of the ICCPR.235  The United Nations Human Rights Committee issued 
a series of General Comments on articles contained in the ICCPR in order to assist 
State Parties to the ICCPR.236  General comment number 22 deals with the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
The United Nations Human Rights Committee indicates the importance of article 18 and 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in paragraph 1 of General 
Comment 22, which states that Article 18: 
is far-reaching and profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, 
personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested 
individually or in community with others.  The fundamental character of these freedoms 
is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of 
public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the Covenant.237 
Paragraph (2)(a) of General Comment 22 emphasizes that all beliefs are protected by 
freedom of religion or belief equally; this includes atheist and non-religious beliefs.  It 
states that ‘Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the 
right not to profess any religion or belief’.238 
Choice is very important under article 18 and the right to choose or replace a religion or 
belief is guaranteed.239  In order to make the correct decision, the right to full and free 
disclosure as to the truth, benefits and disadvantages of any religion or belief should be 
included in the ICCPR, meaning the right to criticize any or all religions or beliefs is an 
                                                                  
235International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) article 18. 
236Clarke B (2007) 103. 
237UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience or Religion), 30 July 1993, paragraph 1. 
238UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience or Religion), 30 July 1993, paragraph 2. 
239Cherry M ‘Speaking Freely About Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and Blasphemy’ available at 
http://www.iheu.org/files/Speaking%20Freely%20about%20Religion.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011). 
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important element of freedom of religion.240  Paragraph 5 of General Comment 22 
states that ‘The Committee observes that the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to 
replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well 
as the right to retain one's religion or belief’.241 
Article 18(3) is a limitation on the freedom to manifest religion or belief; it is not a 
limitation on the freedom of thought and conscience, as these are protected 
unconditionally.242  Paragraph 3 of General Comment 22 states that: 
Article 18 does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and 
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice.  
These freedoms are protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold 
opinions without interference in article 19.1.243 
Finally, the right to freedom of religion or belief does not protect religions, it protects the 
individual.244  The right to have one’s religion or belief at all times exempted from 
criticism, ridicule or insult, in other words having your religious feelings protected at all 
times, is not protected by this right.245 
The right to freedom of expression is protected under article 19 of the ICCPR, and 
General Comment 10 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee deals with the 
right to freedom of expression.246  According to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, there are no exceptions and restrictions on the right to hold an opinion.  It is 
                                                                  
240Cherry M ‘Speaking Freely About Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and Blasphemy’ available at 
http://www.iheu.org/files/Speaking%20Freely%20about%20Religion.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011). 
241UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience or Religion), 30 July 1993, paragraph 5. 
242Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 
‘Some other Key Rights: Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, Opinion, Expression, Association and 
Assembly’ available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter12en.pdf (accessed 25 November 
2011). 
243UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience or Religion), 30 July 1993 paragraph 3. Discussing the full General comments will not contribute to the 
mini-theses and is unfortunately beyond its scope. 
244Cherry M ‘Speaking Freely About Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and Blasphemy’ available at 
http://www.iheu.org/files/Speaking%20Freely%20about%20Religion.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011). 
245Temperman J (2008). 
246International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) article 19. 
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logical because you cannot control what goes on in a person’s mind.247  Paragraph 1 of 
General Comment 10 requires protection of the ‘right to hold opinions without 
interference’; this is a right to which the Covenant permits no exception or restriction.248 
The right to freedom of expression would be infringed if States tried to stop the public 
from watching satellite television networks, using mobile phones, the internet or trying to 
monitor private communications for the purpose of enforcing oppressive and 
discriminatory laws.249  Paragraph 2 of General Comment 10 requires protection of the 
right to freedom of expression, which includes not only freedom to ‘impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, but also freedom to seek and receive them regardless of frontiers 
and in whatever medium, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice’.250 
Although freedom of expression is the cornerstone of liberalism and democracy it is not 
absolute and may be limited in terms of Article 19(3) which is the limitations clause 
telling a State when they can and cannot limit the right to freedom of expression.  Since 
freedom of expression is a paramount right in a democratic society, any restriction must 
meet a strict requirement meaning the restriction must comply with the principles of 
legality and proportionality and be imposed for one or more of the legitimate purposes in 
article 19(3).251  Paragraph 3 of General Comment 10 lays down conditions, and it is 
only subject to these conditions that restrictions may be imposed.  The restrictions must 
be ‘provided by law; they may only be imposed for one of the purposes set out in 
                                                                  
247Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and 
Lawyers’. Some other Key Rights: Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, Opinion, Expression, Association 
and Assembly’ available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter12en.pdf (accessed 25 
November 2011). 
248UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 10: Article 19 (Freedom of Expression), 29 
June 1983, paragraph 1. See also Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for 
Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers‘ Some other Key Rights: Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, Opinion, 
Expression, Association and Assembly’ available at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter12en.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011). 
249Clarke B ‘Freedom of Speech and Criticism of Religion: What are the Limits?’ (2007) 14 Murdoch University E 
Law Journal 104. 
250UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 10: Article 19 (Freedom of Expression), 29 
June 1983, paragraph 2. 
251Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 
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subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be justified as being 
necessary for that State party for one of those purposes’.252 
Article 20 also limits freedom of expression it states that ‘propaganda for war and any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’.253 
3.2.2 The conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
under the ICCPR 
 
Article 5 of the ICCPR prevents people from using their rights as a weapon to attack the 
rights of others.  It states that: 
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, on any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present Covenant.254 
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention confirms article 5 of the ICCPR, emphasising that 
there should be no hierarchy of rights or conflict of rights under international human 
rights law and that balancing of competing rights should take place.  It states the 
following: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.255 
The right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR is not absolute and may be limited 
                                                                  
252UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 10: Article 19 (Freedom of Expression), 29 
June 1983, paragraph 1. 
253International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 article 20. 
254International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) article 5. 
255Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (1969) 8 ILM article 5. 
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in order to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, 
public health and morals.256  Under the ICCPR, freedom of expression protects 
ridiculing the religious beliefs of others, and claiming the protection of religion is not a 
legitimate ground for limiting freedom of expression.257  The ICCPR does not protect a 
particular religion, it protects people and every person has the right to freedom of 
religion or belief which includes the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, and the 
right to manifest that religion or belief either individually or in a community.258  The right 
to have one’s religion or belief at all times exempted from criticism or ridicule is not 
included under international human rights law and no right or duty is placed on a person 
to respect another’s religious feelings.259 
This mini–thesis submits that under international human rights law, if a person’s right to 
freedom of religion is affected, which is not the same as the right to respect one’s 
religious feelings it is a legitimate ground to limit freedom of expression.  According to 
Temperman, ridiculing and insulting a person’s religious beliefs and practices is not a 
threat or limit to a person’s right to freedom of religion and it also does not affect a 
person’s freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief or to freely exercise the religion or 
belief in question and therefore would not be a justifiable limitation on the right to 
freedom of expression.260  It is further submitted by Temperman that a state must prove 
that freedom of expression actually impedes or jeopardises a person’s freedom of 
religion or belief and that a group of believers being insulted by a publication, film or a 
play does not show an actual impediment or jeopardy to a person’s religion or belief in 
terms of the ICCPR.261  This mini-thesis agrees with the statement but the agreement is 
conditional and would vary depending on the instrument protecting these rights. 
                                                                  
256Temperman J (2008) 526-527. 
257I have chosen to determine whether a conflict exist under the ICCPR and the UDHR because the ICCPR is an 
elaboration of the UDHR and a binding document. Temperman J (2008) 527. 
258Temperman J (2008) 526. 
259Eltayeb MSM ‘The Limitations on Critical Thinking on Religious Issues under Article 20 of ICCPR and Its 
Relation to Freedom of Expression’ available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:-
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At international level a case where the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression have come into conflict has not occurred but at regional level in Europe 
three cases have been dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
This mini-thesis will therefore discuss the conflict of the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression at regional level, focusing on the European Region. 
3.3 Regional regulation of the right to freedom of religion and freedom 
of expression 
 
Three regions have developed their own declarations and conventions to protect and 
enforce human rights namely Europe, the Americas and Africa.  Regional agencies and 
courts are more effective at investigating alleged violations of rights and providing relief 
for victims because of its location, and regional agencies are more familiar with the 
culture and identity of the region and would have a better understanding of the 
problems, circumstances and possible reform.262  Regional human rights arrangements 
are important because of their ability ‘to extend the domestic impact of international 
human rights guarantees through the treaty-enabled Courts and Commissions’.263 
The purpose of discussing the regional regulation of these rights is to determine how 
the mechanisms which ensure compliance of the rights under these instruments have 
dealt with the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression. 
This mini-thesis, as referred to in section 3.2.2 of chapter 3, will be discussing the 
European region in order to determine how it has dealt with the conflict between the 
right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression under The European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).  This mini-
thesis will not be discussing the African region and the African charter because the 
African commission and the African court whose duty is to enforce, clarify and specify 
articles under the African Charter, have been in operation for a very short time and has 
                                                                  
262Nickel J ‘Human Rights’ available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#regional (accessed 24 
November 2011). 
263Agocha B M The Application of the Local Remedies Rule Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights: With a Case Study of Communications from the Niger Delta (unpublished LLM thesis, McGill University, 
Montreal, 2009 ) 29. 
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heard little cases.  It has not yet dealt with a case where the conflict between freedom of 
religion and expression has come into question and therefore will not contribute to this 
mini-thesis.264  The American region and the American Charter will not be discussed 
because the articles of freedom of religion and expression under the American 
Convention is almost identical to that of the ICCPR, which has already been discussed, 
and little guidance is provided on solving the conflict of these rights under this region.265 
3.3.1 Freedom of religion and expression under the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
 
The ECHR is adopted under the auspices of the council of Europe.  The ECHR formally 
applies to Council of Europe Member states only, and the interpretative authority on this 
convention is the ECtHR.266  Any individual or organization claiming that their right 
under the ECHR has been violated may lodge an application directly with the ECtHR 
after all relevant domestic remedies in the member state concerned have been 
exhausted.267 
The rights in the ECHR have no hierarchal order and the responsibility of determining 
what each right means vest with the ECtHR.268  If a conflict arises between two or more 
rights in the ECHR, the ECtHR would resolve the conflict by determining if the national 
non judicial authorities have struck an appropriate balance taking factors such as the 
context of the specific litigation and the margins of appreciation into account.269 
Paragraph two (2) of article 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR use analogous concepts and 
                                                                  
264Coliver S ‘The Article 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook’ available at 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/1993-handbook.pdf (accessed 24 November 2011). See also 
Evans MD and Murray R The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 
(2008) 215, 220. 
265American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.  
266Cerone J ‘Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 363. 
267Voorhoof D &Cannie H ‘Freedom of Expression and Information in a Democratic Society: The Added but Fragile 
Value of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 72 The International Communication Gazette 408. 
268 Greer S ‘Balancing and the European Court of Human Right: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ 
(2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 423. 
269Voorhoof D & Cannie H (2010) 409. 
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follow a similar pattern if there is an interference with these rights.270  If the right to 
freedom of religion conflicts with freedom of expression, the ECtHR follows the same 
approach; firstly it would be determined whether an interference with the right to 
freedom of expression under article 10(1) took place, then a determination as to 
whether the interference was prescribed by law and pursued by legitimate aims under 
Article 10(2) and finally whether the interference was necessary in a democratic 
society.271 
To be more specific on the evaluation of article 10(2), the court conducts a two-part test 
in order to determine if the infringement is justified.  In the first stage of the test the court 
determines whether the restriction is prescribed by law; for a restriction to be prescribed 
by law it must meet the minimal standard of the rule of law.  To meet the minimal 
standards, the law must serve a legitimate aim e.g. section 10(2) and must not be void 
for vagueness.272 
In the second stage of the test the court determines whether the restriction is necessary 
in a democratic society in terms of the reasons listed in the article.  A proportionality test 
is conducted by the court to determine how important the goal of the restriction is and to 
determine whether the scope is exceeded in trying to achieve this goal.273 
A number of cases decided by the ECtHR determined and elaborated the 
characteristics of this test.  The court has to address the following questions but this is 
not a closed list: 
1. Whether the interference complained of is responding to a pressing social need.274 
                                                                  
270Discussing why the court have not developed interpretation of the concepts with reference to article 9 is 
unfortunately beyond this thesis read Javier MT ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: The Permissible 
Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Perspective’ available at 
http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-
Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE&docId=A114945130&source=gale&srcprod=AONE&u
serGroupName=uwcape&version=1.0 (accessed 12 June 2011). 
271Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR).  See Grinberg M ‘Defamation of Religions v Freedom of Expression: Finding the 
Balance in a Democratic Society’ (2006) 18 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 206. 
272Vance SC ‘The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offenses Under European Convention Principles’ 
(2005) 14 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 204.  
273Vance SC (2005) 201. 
274Financial Times v. The United Kingdom Application no. 821/03 (2009) ECtHR. 
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2. Are the means chosen, rationally connected to the objective 
3. Have the national authorities given justified reasons for their interference.275 
4.  Does the restriction impair the right as little as possible.276 
5.  Are the effects on the rights proportionate to the legitimate aims it pursued.277 
This ‘doctrine of margin of appreciation’ is considered by the ECtHR at the 
proportionality stage.278  When the national authorities applies the restriction on 
freedoms stated in the ECHR articles example paragraph 2 in article 8-11, then it must 
be given a reasonable margin of appreciation. The doctrine of margin of appreciation 
gives EU member states a certain amount of flexibility when interpreting the application 
and limitation of rights in the ECHR.279  In terms of the margin of appreciation the 
ECtHR holds the belief that national authorities should be given leeway because they 
are closer to the respective societies, are in a better position to evaluate the necessity 
of the restrictive measures adopted and they can better appraise the needs of the public 
interest and interpret the relevant domestic law.280 
                                                                  
275Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom Application no. 68416/01 (2005) ECtHR and Manolea O. v. Moldova, 
Application no. 13936/02 17 (2009) ECtHR. 
276Sunday Times (No. 1) v. The United Kingdom Application no 6538/74 26 (1979) ECtHR. 
277Karsai v. Hungary Application No. 5380/07 (2009) ECtHR. See also Voorhoof D & Cannie H (2010) 410. 
278 Definition of margin of appreciation: 
Margin of appreciation refers to the power of a Contracting State in assessing the 
factual circumstances, and in applying the provisions envisaged in international 
human rights instruments. Margin of appreciation is based on the notion that each 
society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights and national 
interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse moral 
convictions.  
For further reading on the margin of appreciation see Vance SC (2005) 202-249, Bakircioglu O ‘The Application of 
the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2007) 8 German Law Journal 711 and Hutchinson MR ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’(1999) 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 639. 
279Vance SC (2005) 201. The cases of Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR, 
Wingrove v. United Kingdom Application no. 17419/90 (1997) ECtHR and I.A. v. Turkey Application no. 42571/98 
(2005) ECtHR illustrates a countries margin of appreciation when it comes to limiting rights under the ECHR. The 
case of Dubowska & Skup v. Poland Application No. 34055/96 and 33490/96 (1997) illustrates the application of 
rights under the ECHR. 
280Javier MT ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Perspective’ available at 
http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-
Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE&docId=A114945130&source=gale&srcprod=AONE&u
serGroupName=uwcape&version=1.0 ( accessed 12 June 2011). 
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The right to freedom of religion is stipulated and protected by Article 9(1) of the 
ECHR.281  In article 9(1) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
guaranteed without qualifications, meaning that any thought, moral conviction or 
opinions on religious or other issues are absolute as long as they are silent and not 
expressed.282  This makes sense because it is part of a person’s conscience and 
intangible, making it impossible for a State to breach.283  Article 9(2) protects the right to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching practice and observance.284  The 
right to manifest one’s religion or belief is not absolute and may be limited in terms of 
Article 9(2) of the ECHR.285  If the right to manifestation was to be limited by article 9(2), 
two things have to be met: (1) the limitation must be prescribed by law and (2) it must 
be necessary in a democratic society.286 
The right to freedom of expression is stipulated and protected by Article 10(1) of the 
ECHR which includes the right to hold an opinion and to receive and impart information 
and ideas.287  Freedom of expression is not only applicable to information or ideas that 
are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also those that offend shock or disturb.288  Article 10(2) sets out the exceptions to 
freedom of expression.  For a restriction, any formalities, conditions or penalties 
imposed by the State to be lawful it must comply with the principle of legality, the 
                                                                  
281Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 9. 
282Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 9(1). For commentary see van Dijk F, van Hoof F, van Rijn A & Zwaak L 
Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 4 ed (2006) 752. 
283Kufner S, Rube D & Sonczyk B ‘The Santo Daime Church: The Protection of Freedom of Religion Under 
International Law’ available at http://www.bialabate.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/Santo-Daime1.AILC.FINAL-
REPORT.14.03.07.pdf  (accessed 10 December 2011). 
284Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 9(2). For commentary see van Dijk F, van Hoof F, van Rijn A &Zwaak L(2006) 
761. 
285Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 9(2). For commentary see Torron J M ‘The Permissible Scope of Legal 
Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief: The European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 3 Global 
Jurist Advances 4. 
286 Evans MD Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (1997) 315-328. 
287Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 10 (1). 
288Lingens v. Austria Application No 9815/82 (1986) ECtHR. See also Cerone J ‘Inappropriate Renderings: The 
Danger of Reductionist Resolutions’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 365.  
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condition of legitimate purpose and the principle of necessity in a democratic society.289 
The ECtHR has had the opportunity to examine the interaction between the right to 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion in a number of cases and although these 
rights can interact in numerous ways, for example a State can permit or prohibit certain 
expression which conflict with religious views, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with 
regard to the interaction between these rights centres on the protection of religious 
feelings.290  In three cases decided by the ECtHR which concerned blasphemy laws 
namely Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, Wingrove v the UK and İ.A. v Turkey, the 
interaction between freedom of expression and freedom of religion resulted in the 
ECtHR protecting the right to freedom of religion and limiting the right to freedom of 
expression.291  These above three cases will be the only cases analysed in this mini-
thesis because they deal with the interaction between freedom of religion and freedom 
of expression and contain elements of blasphemy and the protection of religious 
feelings, which is central to this mini-thesis.  Other cases dealt with by the ECtHR which 
also focus on the interaction between freedom of expression and freedom of religion 
such as Gündüz v. Turkey, 4 December 2003 and Güzel v Turkey, 27 July 2006, which 
deals with hate speech, and Klein v. Slovakia, 31 October 2006 and Albert-Engelmann-
GesellschaftmbH v Austria, 19 January 2006, which deals with criticism of a high 
ranking church official, will not be discussed in this mini-thesis as it is beyond the scope 
of this mini-thesis.  
3.4 Analyses of the cases 
 
3.4.1 Otto Preminger Institut v Austria 
 
This incident started with a request to the public prosecutor by the Innsbruck diocese of 
the Roman Catholic Church to institute criminal proceedings against the Otto-
Preminger-Institut.  The Otto-Preminger-Institut is based in Innsbruck and runs a 
                                                                  
289Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 10(2). 
290Cerone J (2008) 363. 
291Cerone J (2008) 363. 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
cinema.  It was intending to screen a Werner Schroeter film called Council in Heaven on 
13 May 1985.292  The film was based on a nineteenth-century play and it depicted the 
revered figures of Christianity in irreverent and demeaning ways such as the depiction 
of God in image and in text as a senile and impotent idiot, Jesus as a cretin and Mary, 
mother of God, as a wanton woman.293  The reason for instituting criminal proceedings 
was an allegation that the film disparages religious precepts.294 
The Innsbruck regional court ordered a seizure of the film a day before its screening.  
The criminal proceedings were not to convict a particular person but for the forfeiture of 
the film.295  On 10 October 1986, Innsbruck regional court ordered the forfeiture of the 
film relying on the penal code which prohibits expressions insulting ‘an object of 
veneration of a church established within the country’.296  The authorities seized the film 
from the society and also forbade its screening in the country on the grounds that the 
interference with religious feelings outweighed the right to freedom of art in the 
Constitution.297 
On 6 October 1987 the Otto-Preminger-Institut made an application to the European 
Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) on the grounds that the seizure and 
forfeiture of the film was against article 10 of the ECHR, and the Commission found that 
a violation of article 10 did occur with regard to seizure, and forfeiture violated article 
10 of the ECHR.  The Commission found in favour of nine votes to five with regard to 
seizure and with regard to forfeiture thirteen votes to one.298  The Commission and the 
ECtHR work in conjunction with each other; the Commission works as a filter which 
resolves a claim before it reaches the ECtHR.299  If the Commission finds an application 
admissible and are unable to broker a friendly settlement between the parties then the 
                                                                  
292Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. See also Mularoni A ‘The Society Of 
Information: Freedom, Pluralism, Resources’ (2006) 30 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 4. 
293Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. See also Mclaughlin N (2010) 402. 
294Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR paragraph 1-57. For a discussion on 
the case see also Misthal MP ‘Reigning in the Paparazzi: The Human Rights Act, The European Convention On 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and The Rights of Privacy and Publicity in England’ (1998) 10 
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296Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. 
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application will be heard by the ECtHR.  However, if the Commission finds an 
application inadmissible, the application will not go any further.300  The case was 
referred to the ECtHR by the Commission on 7 April 1993 and by the Government of the 
Austrian Republic on 14 May 1993.301  The reason for the referral was to establish if 
Austria breached its obligations under Article 10 of the ECHR.  The ECtHR held by six 
votes to three that there had been no violation of article 10 by the Austrian courts when 
it ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the film.302 
In the ECtHR, the Austrian lawyers turned the conflict between Otto-Preminger-Institut 
and the state of Austria into a conflict between rights namely freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion.  The focus was on the legitimate aim of limiting freedom of 
expression in terms of article 10(2) to protect the rights of others.  The ECtHR held that 
Austria had legitimately limited the right to free speech to protect the religious rights of 
others.303  The ECtHR also found that the national authorities were capable of 
assessing the needs of its society better than an international judge and did not 
overstep the margin of appreciation as they were entitled to stop what could be thought 
of as unwarranted and offensive attacks on the religious beliefs on the majority of 
believers in Austria.304 
In the case of Otto-Preminger v Austria the reasoning behind the majority decision of 
the ECtHR in accepting the decision of the Austrian court that the film lacked any artistic 
merit that could outweigh the offence and that seizing the film was to protect the 
religious feelings of the majority of the county’s people, which was Christianity, was 
firstly that the film was advertised and that there was sufficient public knowledge of the 
film’s content to cause offence, and secondly the ECtHR pointed out that the Roman 
Catholic religion was the majority religion of Tyroleans with eighty seven percent (87%) 
following it and therefore the Austrian authorities, in seizing the film, did not overstep the 
                                                                  
300Misthal MP (1998) 9. 
301Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. 
302Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. 
303Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. See also Haarscher G ‘Symposium: 
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margin of appreciation as the seizure was to protect religious peace and the religious 
feelings of Christians from offence.305 
The dissenting judges had a very different view from the majority decision.  Three out of 
the nine judges found firstly that the seizure and forfeiture was a complete denial of 
freedom of expression and stated that such denial is only justified if the speech was so 
abusive that it would come close to a denial of freedom of religion of others, which the 
film does not.306  The dissenting judges held firstly that there was ‘little likelihood of 
anyone being confronted with objectionable material unwittingly’ and secondly that the 
applicant acted ‘responsibly in such a way as to limit, as far as it could reasonably have 
been expected to, the possible harmful effects of showing the film’.307  The dissenting 
judgment stated further that ‘on balance, the seizure and forfeiture of the film in question 
were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.308 
The issue of religious feelings plays an important part in the reasoning behind the 
majority decision, however the dissenting judges denied that this protection exists if you 
look at the letters of article 9 ECHR.  Looking strictly at the wording of article 9 of the 
ECHR it does not include the right to be protected from offensive expression nor the 
right to be protected against criticism or ridicule by others, but it does provide for 
restriction of expression where the expression would impair the enjoyment of article 9 of 
the ECHR freedoms.  In Otto-Preminger v Austria the majority judgment of ECtHR 
                                                                  
305Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. See also Tsakyrakis S ‘The B 
Balancing  Method on the Balance: Human Rights Limitations in the ECHR’ available 
athttp://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=i.a.%20v.%20turkey%20full%20case&source=web&cd=4&sqi=2&ve
d=0CEkQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.nyu.edu%2Fidcplg%3FIdcService%3DGET_FILE%26dDocNam
e%3DECM_DLV_013717%26RevisionSelectionMethod%3DLatestReleased&ei=cekiUMKkLpKT0QWSyID4DA
&usg=AFQjCNFnIDo6_PpVdtddnYcSX3dGUR57mg&sig2=OnYbJdBKighyTEbFWqer6A (accessed 10 August 
2012). 
306See the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk in Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria 
Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. See also Tsakyrakis S ‘The B Balancing  Method on the Balance: Human 
Rights Limitations in the ECHR’ available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=i.a.%20v.%20turkey%20full%20case&source=web&cd=4&sqi=2&ved
=0CEkQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.nyu.edu%2Fidcplg%3FIdcService%3DGET_FILE%26dDocName
%3DECM_DLV_013717%26RevisionSelectionMethod%3DLatestReleased&ei=cekiUMKkLpKT0QWSyID4DA&
usg=AFQjCNFnIDo6_PpVdtddnYcSX3dGUR57mg&sig2=OnYbJdBKighyTEbFWqer6A (accessed 10 August 
2012). 
307See the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk in Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria 
Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. 
308See the joint dissenting opinion of judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczykin Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria 
Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR.  
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illustrated the need to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of article 9 rights such as the right 
to express and hold religious beliefs.309  The ECtHR did not demonstrate a clear link 
between the protection of religious feelings and the exercise of freedom of religion.  
Protection of religious feelings is not contained in the wording of article 9 ECHR but it 
cannot be discarded that some manifestation of freedom of expression may amount to 
harassment of people who exercise their religion or belief in a certain way.310  
Furthermore, article 9(2) ECHR gives States a wide margin of appreciation to limit free 
speech if it deems it to pose a threat to national security, territorial integrity, public 
safety, the health and morals of society or the reputation and rights of others.311 
3.4.2 Wingrove v the UK 
 
Nigel Wingrove wrote and directed a film called Visions of Ecstasy.  This film focused on 
the sixteenth century Carmelite nun St Teresa of Avila; this nun is believed to have had 
ecstatic visions of Christ.312  The Video Recordings Act 1984 required a video to be 
submitted to the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) before it could be screened 
for the public.  The BBFC stated that this film infringed blasphemy laws and would 
cause outrage because it focused on Christ and therefore rejected the application.313 
Mr. Wingrove appealed this decision to the Video Appeals Commission but was 
unsuccessful.  In 1990 an application was made to the Commission, arguing that 
Mr Wingrove’s right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the ECHR was 
infringed and the Commission agreed that it was with a vote of fourteen to two.314  The 
Commission then referred the case to the ECtHR.315 
The ECtHR, by a vote of seven to two, found that article 10 was not violated.  The 
ECtHR held that although freedom of expression applies to information and ideas that 
                                                                  
309 Taylor PM ‘The Questionable Grounds of Objections to Proselytism and Certain Other Forms of Religious 
Expression’ 2006 Brigham Young University Law Review 6-7. 
310Cerone J (2008) 365. 
311Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) article 9(2). 
312Wingrove v United Kingdom Application no. 17419/90 (1997) ECtHR. 
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shock, offend or disturb the State or any sector of the population, it is not unlimited.316  
Religious beliefs of others or the religious freedom of others is a justifiable limitation on 
freedom of expression, provided that this limitation on expression is necessary in a 
democratic society.  The court found that national laws may prevent or punish gratuitous 
attacks or offences to religious beliefs however the court emphasized that freedom of 
religion is not exempt from all criticism.317 
The case of Wingrove v the UK was the second case after Otto-Preminger v Austria to 
deal with the protection of religious feelings and as in the Otto-Preminger v Austria the 
ECtHR had a different view to the Commission.  The Commission believed that the film, 
as it was a short experimental video, would have limited reach and impact and that 
boxes containing the video cassettes would have a description of its content.  Delegates 
of the Commission stated that ‘the risk that any Christian would unwittingly view the 
video was therefore substantially reduced and so was the need to impose restrictions 
on its distribution’.318  The ECtHR held that a video could be ‘copied, lent, rented, sold 
and viewed in different homes, thereby easily escaping any form of control by the 
authorities’.319 
The dissenting judges in Wingrove v the UK stated that the interference was prior 
restraint which was unacceptable in the field of freedom of expression.  Prior restraint 
occurs when authorities interfere with freedom of expression even though members of 
society whose feelings they seek to protect have not called for such interference.320  
The interference is based on the opinion of the authorities and the actual individuals’ 
opinions remain unknown.  Therefore the judges held that the interference could not 
respond to a pressing social need and therefore could not be regarded as necessary in 
a democratic society.321 
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3.4.3 Similarities between Otto-Preminger v Austria and Wingrove v the UK 
 
The cases of Otto-Preminger v Austria and Wingrove v the UK have many similarities.  
Firstly, the facts in these cases are very similar; both involve audio visual work (films) 
which disparage Christianity and depict sacred figures of the Christian religion in 
demining ways.  In both cases the films were held to be blasphemous by the national 
authorities, namely Austria in the case of Otto-Preminger v Austria and the UK in the 
case of Wingrove v the UK, and the screening of these films was not allowed.  The next 
similarity between these two cases is the applicability of blasphemy laws; in Austria and 
the UK, Christianity is the majority religion and blasphemy laws at the time of these 
cases were in operation in both of these authorities, and in both authorities blasphemy 
laws applied to offences only against the Christian religion.322 
The approach of the ECtHR in these two cases is also very similar.  In both of these 
cases the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was being infringed and the ECtHR 
essentially held that protecting the religious feelings of others was a legitimate aim 
under article 10(2) ECHR and that it was a justifiable limitation on the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression as it was necessary in a democratic society.323  In coming to its 
conclusion in the above two points the ECtHR gave Austria and the UK a wide margin 
of appreciation; the reason for this was that the national authorities had closer contact 
with its societies and was in a better position to determine whether the protection of 
religious feelings is a permissible interference with freedom of expression.  In both 
cases the ECtHR found that not allowing the applicant to screen the film was a 
justifiable limitation on the applicant’s right to freedom of expression.324  Essentially in 
these two cases the ECtHR held that the protection of religious freedom of others was a 
legitimate aim under article 10(2) of the ECHR and justified a limitation on freedom of 
expression, provided that the limitative measure could be seen as necessary in a 
                                                                  
322European Commission for Democracy Through Law ‘Analysis of Domestic Law Concerning Blasphemy, 
Religious Insult and Inciting Religious Hatred in Albania, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, United Kingdom.’ Available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-
AD(2008)026add2-bil.pdf (accessed 10 August 2012). 
323Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR and Wingrove v United Kingdom 
Application no. 17419/90 (1997) ECtHR. 
324Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR and Wingrove v United Kingdom 
Application no. 17419/90 (1997) ECtHR. 
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democratic society.325 
To determine whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the 
ECtHR had to look at two things: (1) the actual social impact of the anti-religious forms 
of expression and (2) whether the remedies provided by criminal law were proportionate 
to the legitimate aims pursued.326  In the Otto-Preminger v Austria and the Wingrove v 
the UK case the ECtHR gave a wide margin of appreciation to Austria and the UK 
because the national authorities had closer contact to its societies, and as the ECtHR 
would find it impossible to ‘discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society’ and therefore ‘it would be impossible for the ECtHR to 
arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible interference with 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed 
against the religious feelings of others’.327 
Based on these two cases it can be concluded that when a conflict arises between 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion under the ECHR that freedom of 
expression will give way to the freedom of majority religious beliefs.  However, these 
cases should be looked at based on its facts and if that is looked at the ECtHR seems 
to indicate, that the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of religion 
should be decided by democratic governments based on the wide margin of 
appreciation given by the court.328 
3.4.4 I.A. v Turkey 
 
In 1993 a book called The Forbidden Phrases, which contained the author’s views on 
philosophical and theological issues, was printed.  In 1994 the Istanbul public 
prosecutor charged the owner and managing director of the publishing company that 
published the book with the crime of blasphemy against God, the religion of Islam, the 
                                                                  
325Javier MT ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Perspective’ available at 
http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-
Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE&docId=A114945130&source=gale&srcprod=AONE&u
serGroupName=uwcape&version=1.0 (accessed 12 June 2011). 
326Voorhoof D & Cannie H (2010) 410. 
327Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria Application no. 13470/87 (1994) ECtHR. 
328Fuhrmann W (2000) 835. 
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prophet and the holy Quran under Article 175(3) and (4) of the Turkish penal code.329  
The managing director was convicted in 1996 for the charge of blasphemy and was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine.  An appeal was then lodged in the 
Turkish court of cassation, which confirmed the decision.330 
The matter was then taken to the ECtHR by the manager, and four of seven judges 
found that article 10 of the Convention had not been violated.  Their reasoning was that 
the book was an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam and justified the applicant’s 
conviction.331  The ECtHR stated that by imposing the limitation on the manager’s 
freedom of expression, the Turkish authorities protected against offensive attacks on 
matters regarded as sacred by Muslims and as such corresponded to a pressing social 
need.332  The ECtHR also held that the Turkish authorities did not overstep its margin of 
appreciation as the reasons for the restriction was relevant and sufficient.333 
In IA V Turkey the ECtHR used the principles it established in the Otto-Preminger v 
Austria and Wingrove v the UK cases to uphold a conviction of blasphemy a Turkish 
court imposed on the director of a publishing house who published a book which was 
offensive to Muslims.334  The majority of the ECtHR (four out of seven) relied on the 
rulings of the above cases and saw the case as a clash between two rights namely the 
right of the applicant to impart to the public his views on religious doctrines and the right 
                                                                  
329IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
Article 175 3-4 of the Turkish Penal code states that  
It shall be an offence punishable by six months’ to one year’s imprisonment and a heavy fine of 5,000 
to 25,000 Turkish liras to blaspheme against God, one of the religions, one of the prophets, one of the 
sects or one of the holy books or to vilify or insult another on account of his religious beliefs or 
fulfilment of religious duties 4. The penalty for the offence set out in 
the third paragraph of this Article shall be doubled where it has been committed by means of a 
publication. 
330IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
331IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR, Paragraph 12 of this case states: 
However, the present case concerns not only comments that offend or shock, or a ‘provocative’ 
opinion, but also an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a 
certain tolerance of criticism of religious doctrine within Turkish society, which is deeply attached to 
the principle of secularity, believers may legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted 
and offensive attacks through the following passages: ‘Some of these words were, moreover, inspired 
in a surge of exultation, in Aisha’s arms God’s messenger broke his fast through sexual intercourse, 
after dinner and before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or 
a live animal. 
332IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
333IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
334IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
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of others to respect their freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and proceeded to 
balance these rights.335  The court found that the law of blasphemy was intended to 
protect against attacks on matters which are considered sacred by Muslims and the 
measure used by the Turkish authority was to meet a pressing social need and 
therefore it did not violate freedom of speech.336 
It was interesting that in the majority decision of this case there was no analysis of the 
factual evidence submitted to the court; the court was satisfied with a short statement 
on the abusive nature of the offensive opinions contained in the book.337  Three out of 
the seven judges gave a joint dissenting decision criticizing the majority decision as well 
as the cases of Otto-Preminger v Austria and Wingrove v the UK.  The dissenting 
opinion discusses certain facts which the majority decision failed to analyse such as the 
impact of the book on the Turkish society, the right to defend atheistic ideas as well as 
the fact that the public did not demand prosecution; it was the public prosecution who 
instituted proceedings.338  The most intense part of the dissenting opinion was its 
criticism of the Otto-Preminger v Austria and Wingrove v the UK cases.  It stated that: 
The time has perhaps come to ‘revisit’ this case-law, which in our view seems to place 
too much emphasis on conformism or uniformity of thought and to reflect an 
overcautious and timid conception of freedom of the press.339 
3.4.5 Similarities and differences between IA v Turkey and Otto-Preminger v 
Austria and Wingrove v the UK 
 
The IA v Turkey case departed from the Otto-Preminger v Austria and Wingrove v the 
UK cases’ focus of equating freedom of religion or belief with the respect for one’s 
                                                                  
335IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. See also Tsakyrakis S ‘The B Balancing  Method on the 
Balance: Human Rights Limitations in the ECHR’ available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=i.a.%20v.%20turkey%20full%20case&source=web&cd=4&sqi=2&ve
d=0CEkQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.law.nyu.edu%2Fidcplg%3FIdcService%3DGET_FILE%26dDocNam
e%3DECM_DLV_013717%26RevisionSelectionMethod%3DLatestReleased&ei=cekiUMKkLpKT0QWSyID4DA&u
sg=AFQjCNFnIDo6_PpVdtddnYcSX3dGUR57mg&sig2=OnYbJdBKighyTEbFWqer6A (accessed 10 August 2012). 
336IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
337IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
338See the joint dissenting decision of Judges Costa, Barreto and Jungwiert IA in IA v Turkey Application no. 
42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
339See the joint dissenting decision of Judges Costa, Barreto and Jungwiert IA in IA v Turkey Application no. 
42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
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religious feelings.  Instead it focused on the rights of others to freedom of religion as a 
legitimate ground for limitation.340  The ECtHR stated that: 
The issue before the Court involves weighing up the conflicting interests of the exercise 
of two fundamental freedoms, namely the right of the applicant to impart to the public his 
views on religious doctrine on the one hand, and the right of others to respect for their 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion on the other hand.341 
The ECtHR seemed to change its stance in the case of I.A v Turkey from the point of 
view that there is an abstracto conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion and has now abandoned the notion that one has the right not to be insulted in 
one’s religious feelings.  The ECtHR is now focusing on the existing grounds for limiting 
freedom of expression, one of which is article 9(2) ECHR.342 
This mini-thesis submits that the cases discussed indicates the way in which the ECtHR 
deals with the conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion and 
although these cases dealt with blasphemy laws, the ECtHR did not rely on blasphemy 
laws as the overriding factor.  The decisions where centred on article 10 of the ECHR 
and its limitations, the crux being whether the inference on the right to freedom of 
expression is prescribed by law and necessary to the functioning of a democratic 
society.343 
In each of the abovementioned cases, the country in which these cases were made 
namely Austria, The United Kingdom and Turkey, found that limiting freedom of 
                                                                  
340IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98 (2005) ECtHR. 
341IA v Turkey Application no. 42571/98) (2005 ECtHR. The ECtHR in Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria paragraph 
27 focused on the protection of religious feelings stating the following: 
The measures complained of were based on the Austrian Penal Code Their purpose was to protect 
the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of 
other persons The Court accepts that the impugned measures pursued a legitimate aim under Article 
10 para. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of the rights of 
others. 
The ECtHR in the case of Wingrove v The United Kingdom also elaborated on the right no to be insulted in ones 
religious feelings Sating the following: 
The Commission considered that the English law of blasphemy is intended to suppress behaviour 
directed against objects of religious veneration that is likely to cause justified indignation amongst 
believing Christians. It follows that the application of this law in the present case was intended to 
protect the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings. 
342Temperman J (2008) 534-544. 
343Grinberg M (2006) 206. 
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expression was necessary in order to protect freedom of religion.  The ECtHR agreed 
with these countries and stated that limiting freedom of expression is justified under 
article 10(2) in order to protect freedom of religion.344  Although blasphemy was involved 
in each of these cases the majority religion in each country was protected not just 
Christianity.345 
A wide margin of appreciation was given to the national authorities in these cases 
because they were closer to the societal aspect than the ECtHR.  In these cases the 
ECtHR found that these restrictive measures where within the authority’s legal 
framework.346  Based on the wide margin of appreciation given by the ECtHR to national 
authorities, it is indicating that the relationship between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion should be decided by the country itself.347 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has determined that a conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression does not exist under the ICCPR.  It has established that under the ICCPR 
freedom of expression protects ridiculing the religious beliefs of others, and claiming the 
protection of religion is not a legitimate ground for limiting freedom of expression.  It 
further established that the right to have one’s religion or belief at all times exempted 
from criticism or ridicule is not included under international human rights law and no 
right or duty is placed on a person to respect another’s religious feelings.  Insulting a 
person’s religious beliefs and practices under the ICCPR is not a threat or limit to a 
person’s right to freedom of religion and it also does not affect a person’s freedom to 
have or adopt a religion or belief or to freely exercise the religion or belief in question 
and therefore would not be a justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression. 
As the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression has not come into conflict 
under international law, it therefore provided no guidance on how to deal with the 
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conflict and therefore the regional division of Europe was discussed.  Under the ECHR 
the right to freedom of expressions is not only applicable to information or ideas that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference but also 
those that offend, shock or disturb.  The ECtHR had the opportunity of examining 
freedom of expression in relation to freedom of religion in a string of cases relating to 
the protection of religious feelings.  These cases are Otto-Preminger v Austria, 
Wingrove v The United Kingdom and I.A v Turkey.  In each of these cases the States 
suppressed expression in order to protect religious feelings and the ECtHR found this 
suppression of expression justified.  The analysis of the case law has indicated that the 
way to solve the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression is not 
to declare that one right should automatically be favoured over the other but that a case 
by case enquiry should be taken in order to establish which right should prevail. 
This chapter has established that a conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression does not exist under the ICCPR and it has discussed the approach used by 
the ECtHR to deal with the conflict between these rights.  This mini-thesis will now 
discuss whether the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression conflicts 
under the South African Constitution and how this conflict is dealt with. 
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Chapter Four 
The Protection of Religious Dignity in South Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
 
We have recently emerged from a severely restrictive past where expression, especially 
political and artistic expression, was extensively circumscribed by various legislative 
enactments.  The restrictions that were placed on expression were not only a denial of 
democracy itself, but also exacerbated the impact of the systemic violations of other 
fundamental human rights in South Africa.  Those restrictions would be incompatible 
with South Africa’s present commitment to a society based on a constitutionally 
protected culture of openness and democracy and universal human rights for South 
Africans of all ages, classes and colours.348 
During the apartheid era the authoritarian South African State censored its subjects and 
restricted their ability to take part in democratic dialogue affecting their personal 
freedoms.349  The move from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy has 
resulted in a drastic change.350  During the apartheid era Parliament could make any 
law they wished in South Africa, however Constitutional democracy and the Bill of 
Rights are now supreme in South Africa.351  The supremacy of the Constitution was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the case of Executive Council of the Western 
Cape Legislature v President of the RSA.  The Constitutional Court stated that ‘it is of 
crucial importance at this early stage of the development of our new constitutional order, 
to establish respect for the principle that the Constitution is supreme’.352  The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has been operational since 
                                                                  
348Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (11 April 2002). 
349 de Vos P ‘Is Everyone Going Completely Mad?’ available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/is-everyone-
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4 February 1997 and is the highest law of the land.  Anything inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.353 
Deep scarring existed in the South African society as a result of the racism, 
discrimination, inequality and injustice caused by apartheid.354  This mini-thesis submits 
that humiliation, death and suffering were the legacy left to South Africans.  Following 
the Apartheid era the African National Congress (ANC) became the dominant party and 
South Africa’s focus was now on eliminating the scarring of the past by protecting 
human rights.355  The Constitution was the bridge which informed South Africans of the 
past and provided a vision for the future. 
The sections in the Constitution which stand out in combating the apartheid past are: 
1) The Preamble which states that the Constitution has been adopted to heal the 
divisions of the past and create a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and basic human rights.356 
2) Section 1 of the Constitution emphasizes that human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms is one of the founding 
values of South Africa.357 
3) Section 7 states that the Bill of Rights included in chapter 2 of the Constitution, is the 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa, and that it affirms the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom.358 
The Bill of rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It contains the rights 
of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
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Law Review 192. 
354Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (11 April 2002). 
355Haigh RF (2006). See also Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 
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and freedom.359  Every right in the Bill of Rights protects certain interests and conduct of 
people.  All three branches of law namely the executive, legislature and judiciary, as 
well as private relationships are bound by the Bill of Rights.360  The right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion clauses are protected in the Bill of Rights under 
section 15 and sixteen 16.  Bearers of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion are empowered by the Bill of Rights as it shields the protected conduct and 
interests from unlawful limitations.361  The right to freedom of expression and religion 
are not absolute and may be limited in accordance with Section 36 of the Constitution, 
which is known as the limitations clause.362 
Even in South Africa with its supreme democracy and respect for diversity the conflict 
illustrated in the previous chapters is not unknown.  The first newspaper to publish the 
Danish cartoons in South Africa was the Mail & Guardian in its edition dated 3 February 
to 9 February 2006.363  An urgent interim order in the Johannesburg High Court to 
prohibit the publishers and printers of the newspaper from publishing and distributing 
the cartoons was sought.364  The right to freedom of expression gave rise to the 
complex issue of determining whether words which ridicule the religion of a vulnerable 
group are firstly protected by this right or denied by it, and secondly if the former was 
positively answered whether a limitation of this right would be justifiable.365 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression conflict under the South African Constitution, thereby 
causing a constitutional dilemma.  The secondary purpose is whether the courts’ 
approach in the case of Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncom Media Investment Ltd 
and Others was the correct approach when dealing with a conflict between rights. 
                                                                  
359Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 7(1). 
360Natural and juristic person are bound by the bill of rights, see Rautenbach IM ‘The Bill of Rights Applies to 
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361Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
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4.2 Freedom of religion and freedom of expression under the South 
African Constitution 
 
4.2.1 The right to freedom of religion under the South African Constitution 
 
The right to freedom of religion is protected under Section 15 of the South African 
Constitution which guarantees the right to have a belief, to express that belief publicly, 
to manifest that belief by worship and practice, teaching and dissemination, of religious 
groups to manage their affairs without interference, not to be restricted from acting or 
refraining from acting in a manner contrary to one’s religious beliefs.366  The right is 
guaranteed to both natural persons, individually and collectively, to juristic persons and 
unincorporated associations.367  However, bearers of the right to freedom of religion are 
not given carte blanche in the exercise and manifestation of their religious beliefs.368  
The right to religious diversity and pluralism in society is protected in the Bill of Rights 
but this is qualified in that the right to practice one’s religion may not be exercised in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.369 
In order to receive protection from section 15(1) you do not have to prove that you are 
an adherent to a religion.  The right not to believe at all is also protected, meaning that 
you can be a sceptic, agnostic or atheist.370  There is no establishment clause in section 
15(1); this means that there is no clause mandating the separation of church and 
state.371  In the Prince v President of the law society of the Cape of Good Hope case it 
was stated that section 15(1) protects religious belief and practice or manifestation of 
                                                                  
366Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 16. See Prince v President, Cape Law Society and 
other (2001)2 SA 388 (CC). 
367Van Der Schyff G The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 2001) 52. 
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belief and prohibits coercion or restraint of religious belief or practice.372 
This mini-thesis submits that section 15(1) contains two parts, namely firstly to 
constitute the freedom to practice one's freedom without interference from the state and 
secondly to constitute religious quality.  It further submits that the right to freedom of 
religion has an individual and collective element as it protects individuals and 
communities.  The right to freedom of religion is a right with a wide scope and is viewed 
as both a liberty right and an equality right.373 
4.2.2 The right to freedom of expression under the South African Constitution 
 
The right to freedom of expression is protected under section 16 of the South African 
Constitution.  Section 16 has two parts, section 16(1) and section 16(2); the first part 
deals with protected expression and the second part deals with expression specifically 
excluded.  Each element in these two clauses will be discussed in turn.  The 
Constitutional Court confirms the above statement in the Islamic Unity Convention v 
Independent Broadcasting Authority and others where it was stated that:  
Subsection (1) is concerned with expression that is protected under the Constitution.  If 
there is any limitation of this category of expression it must satisfy the requirements of 
the limitation clause to be constitutionally valid.  Sub-section (2) deals with expressions 
that are specifically excluded from the protection of the right.374 
Section 16(1) will be known as protected expression.  The expression which is 
protected by this section includes any material that communicates or attempts to 
communicate.375  What this means is that it includes speech that may be considered of 
low value such pornography, including child pornography, nude dancing and 
                                                                  
372Prince v President of the Law of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). Discussing Section 
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at http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/archive/Anel_du_Plessis.pdf  (accessed 8 
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commercial speech.376  Section 16(2) contains explicit categorical exclusions; it is a 
closed list which means that the court cannot create new types of expression for 
categorical exclusion.377  In Islamic Unity the Court emphasized that any expression that 
is not specifically excluded under section 16(2) enjoys the protection of the right.378  If 
expression falls within one of the categories there is no room for balancing as freedom 
of expression will always lose.379 
Section 16(2)(c) sets a high threshold for hate speech; in order for expression to be 
considered hate speech, two elements have to be present: (1) the expression must 
amount to advocacy of hatred on one of the listed grounds and (2) the advocacy of 
hatred must constitute incitement to cause harm.380 
The first requirement in section 16(2)(c) is that advocacy of hatred must be based on 
one of the following grounds: race, ethnicity, gender or religion.  Advocacy hatred 
according to Milo, Penfold and Anthony, occurs when the speaker promotes hatred or 
attempt to instil hatred in others.381  According to Currie and de Waal, to advocate 
hatred is to propose or call for it, to make a case for it.382  In the Canadian case of R v 
Andrews it was held that hatred is an extreme emotion and advocacy of hatred should 
be confined to statements manifesting detestation, enmity, ill-will and malevolence.383 
In Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission an appeal committee of 
the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) held that the chanting of ‘Kill the 
Farmer, Kill the Boer’ was advocacy of hatred.384  Govender, who wrote the decision, 
remarked that calling for the killing of people because they belong to a particular 
community or race must amount to the advocacy of hatred unless the context clearly 
                                                                  
376Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A ‘Freedom of Expression’ in Woolman S &  Bishop M  Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2005)12. 
377Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 16(2). 
378Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (11 April 2002). 
379Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (11 April 2002). 
380Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 16(2)(c). See also Johannessen L ‘A Critical View of 
the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 138-142.  
381Milo D, Penfold G & Stein A (2005) 80. 
382 Currie I & de Waal J (2005) 375. 
383See the Canadian cases of R v Andrews 43 CCC (3rd) 193 at 211. See also R v Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
384Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 1283 (SAHRC). 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
indicates otherwise’.385  However offensive advocacy of hatred does not amount to hate 
speech unless the second element, which is incitement to cause harm, is present.386 
Harm includes physical violence but does it extend beyond physical violence?387  In the 
Freedom Front v South African Human Rights decision, the appeal committee held that 
harm could not be confined to physical harm, but should also include psychological and 
emotional harm.388  The committee further emphasized that speech must not merely be 
offensive, the harm must be serious and significant and it must be shown that the 
expression itself causes harm or is likely to cause harm.389 
According to the SAHRC appeal committee, the South African Constitutional order is 
based on human dignity and the promotion of inclusivity and tolerance of diversity.390  
According to Currie and de Waal, harm is not confined to physical harm but harm to 
dignity interests is included to the purpose of hate speech exceptions.391 
In terms of section 16(2)(c), incited means directed at or perhaps intended and 
therefore hate speech is advocacy of hatred on a listed ground, intended to cause harm 
to dignity.392 
Based on the above, this mini-thesis submits that although freedom of expression lies at 
the heart of democracy it does not enjoy preference above other rights and it is also not 
an absolute right.393  It can further be concluded that all expression is not protected 
under this clause and if expression falls within section 16(2) it is excluded from 
constitutional protection.  The scope of freedom of expression, which includes the 
protection of all expression which does not fall within Section 16(2), is very wide.  
Freedom of religion also protects a wide scope of application and therefore the potential 
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for an overlap of protected interests and values is a real possibility.  It is further 
submitted that these rights do overlap and, as will be discussed below, the overlap is a 
result of freedom of expression protecting the right to ridicule religions and the right to 
freedom of religion prohibiting the right to ridicule religions as it infringes on a person’s 
right to religious dignity. 
4.3 Religious dignity in South Africa 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  
There is now a need to discuss right to human dignity.  The reason for this need is 
because the right to human dignity played a central role in determining whether freedom 
of expression overstepped its limits in the case of Jamiat-Ul-Ulama v Johncom Media 
Investment Ltd and others.  A better understanding of the right to human dignity in 
South Africa is needed in order to understand the reason for this High Court’s decision. 
The right to human dignity is rooted in Roman law and is not an easy right to define.  
Broadly it is defined as treating people with respect whether in a public or private sense; 
it is also defined as a sense of self-worth that an individual has and it is also deemed to 
be the source of a person’s right to freedom and the right from which other rights 
flow.394  In terms of International law, human dignity underpins human rights 
protection.395  Human dignity is protected under section 10 of the South African 
Constitution.  The Constitutional Court stated the importance of this right in the case of 
Khumalo and Others v Holomisa.396 
The apartheid past has resulted in South Africa creating non-derogable rights and the 
right to human dignity in South Africa is a right that may not be compromised.  The right 
to human dignity is a non-derogable right under the Constitution and as such sets the 
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restrictive standards by which other rights may be enjoyed.397 
The right to human dignity is closely related to freedom of religion.398  Under the South 
African Constitution, human dignity is a core value and as a core value it guides courts 
in determining the purpose and scope of other rights contained in the constitution such 
as freedom of religion.399  The right to religious dignity is a right which incorporates 
freedom of religion and dignity.  How this right is formed will now be discussed. 
Freedom of religion is composed of five freedoms: (1) religious autonomy, (2) choice, 
(3) observance, (4) teaching, and (5) the right to propagate a religion.400  The freedom 
of religious autonomy refers to aspects of the relationship between the State and 
religion as well as other institutional aspects of religion.  It also refers to the individual 
and collective element of the right.401  Religious autonomy includes the right of a 
religious community to establish governing bodies, appoint or elect its leaders, 
determine its organisation and doctrine and decide on its membership.402  The freedom 
of religious autonomy includes the right to dignity because it protects the right to non-
interference by the state and others.403 
The right to freedom of religion is a right which depends on other rights, particularly 
human dignity, to fully realise its scope of protection.  Religion, in other words, relies on 
contextual rights to optimize the protection it offers.404  Freedom of religion is the 
founding principle for the advancement of individual, collective and institutional dignity in 
an attempt at creating a society predicated on respect and tolerance, while human 
dignity as a contextual right to religion supports the inherent dignity accruing to religious 
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liberty405.  The right to human dignity and self-worth of members of society is affirmed 
by their ability to express their thoughts and communicate; expressing oneself also 
allows each individual to determine what is true as well as realize his or her full human 
potential.406  In South Africa, freedom of expression is limited by common law rules, the 
non-derogable right to human dignity and by speech provisions of the constitution.407  
Based on South Africa’s past, it is understandable that freedom of expression is limited 
to promote and protect the freedom of dignity.  
Bearers of the right to freedom of religion enjoy the right to advance and cherish their 
dignity while demanding respect from parties bound by this right.408  According to 
Malherbe, the dignity of a religious community or its members in respect of their beliefs, 
doctrine, structures and modus operandi may not be violated because it affects the 
exercise of their religious freedom in general.409  The right to religious dignity is a 
combination of the right to freedom of religion and the right to human dignity and it 
guarantees complete and total respect and dignity to the bearers of the right.410 
This mini-thesis submits that the Danish cartoons ridiculed the dignity of Muslims and 
therefore infringed on a Muslim’s right to freedom of religion. 
4.4 The Conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
under the South African Constitution 
 
A conflict existed between freedom of expression and dignity long before the Danish 
Cartoons.  It started when the African National congress established and adopted the 
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Freedom Charter in 1955.411  This Charter protected conflicting interest as it guaranteed 
the right to speak but stated that preaching and practice of national, race, or colour 
discrimination and contempt shall be punishable as a crime.412  When the final 
Constitution was drafted, a lot of the principles of the Freedom Charter were included in 
the Constitution and therefore the conflicts between these rights were also included.413 
The Danish cartoons awoke and emphasised this conflict.  This mini-thesis submits that 
the reason why the Danish cartoons caused a conflict between freedom of expression 
and freedom of religion was because the Danish cartoons, as a form of expression, 
ridiculed religious beliefs and practices which in turn affected the exercise of religious 
freedom as it violated the dignity of the bearers of the right to freedom of religion.  
Conflict is part of law.  The law aims is to prevent or settle cases where two or more 
parties have conflicting claims.  When a party has a right, his claim must prevail over his 
opponent’s, a right trumps other claims.  If the Constitution gives both parties a right 
such that each has equal status and the rights are simultaneously enforceable then both 
parties would have a trump card and this would mean that the application of either right 
results in the violation of the other.414  Such a wide range of actions are protected by 
constitutional rights that it’s unavoidable that two of them sometimes overlap in a way 
that makes these rights mutually incompatible.415 
As indicated in section 3.1 of chapter 3, Zucca states that in order for there to be a 
conflict between rights, one norm must make it permissible to do X and the other norm 
must deny the permission to do X.  The actions allowed by both rights are not jointly 
performable.416  A conflict of rights is best explained in the following table: 
 Intra-rights Inter-rights 
Total Conflicts The right to expression v the The right to expression v the 
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right to expression right to religion 
Partial conflicts The right to expression v the 
right to expression 
The right to expression v the 
right to religion 
 
To explain the above table there are two aspects of conflict: (1) rights can either clash in 
such a way that a total conflict or a partial conflict is caused or (2) we can also 
encounter conflicts between the supporting norms of human rights; this is known as 
inter and intra-right conflicts.  Inter-right conflicts occur with different norms of human 
rights while intra-right conflicts occur between two of the same norms of human 
rights.417  Inter and intra-rights conflicts can be total or partial; an inter-right total conflict 
occurs when the two rights cannot be waived without simultaneously being alienated; an 
inter-right partial conflict occurs when two rights conflict but a case by case regulation is 
still available.418 
This min-thesis submits that the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression under the South African Constitution is an inter-right partial conflict. 
4.4.1 Inter-Right partial conflict based on the protection and exclusion of 
ridiculing of religious beliefs 
 
The question to be answered in this section is what type of conflict, if any, is present 
between the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.  This question 
would be determined by establishing whether words which ridicule the religion of often 
vulnerable groups are protected or excluded from protection by the right to freedom of 
expression, and whether ridiculing of religious beliefs is protected or excluded from 
protection by the right freedom of religion. 
Expression that is not specifically excluded under section 16(2) is protected under 
freedom of expression and ridiculing of religious beliefs does not fall under expression 
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that is specifically excluded, therefore it is protected under freedom of expression.419 
Freedom of religion under the South African Constitution is different from the freedom of 
religion clause under international law.  The difference is that under international law, 
freedom of religion does not protect the feelings of believers who take offence at the 
criticism and ridiculing of their belief and practice, however freedom of religion under the 
South Africa Constitution takes religious dignity into consideration.420 
This mini-thesis submits that right to freedom of religion does not protect the ridicule of 
religious beliefs and practices as it is a violation of the religious dignity.  It further 
submits that the right to freedom of expression protects ridicule of religious beliefs as it 
does not fall under expression that is specifically excluded.  Based on the above it can 
be concluded that an inter-right partial conflict between the right to freedom of 
expression and religion exists under the Constitution.  
The reason this mini-thesis states that a partial and not total conflict exists is because 
the Constitution is supreme law in South Africa and if a conflict exists under the 
Constitution it would indicate that a constitutional dilemma exists.  A total and not partial 
conflict would result in a constitutional dilemma.421  A constitutional dilemma will occur 
when constitutional rights conflict with one another and there is no or little guidance.  It 
would involve a deadlock where a solution cannot be found without sacrificing one or 
the other right.422  Deep disagreement over who should decide and resolve the conflict 
and in what manner it should be resolved would take place and the unity and cohesion 
of a society and of a legal system would be threatened.423  The opposing parties could 
face a breakdown in communication which would be dangerous if the continuous 
disagreement and deadlock is not resolved.424 
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Under the South African Constitution, Section 36, which is the limitations clause, 
prevents constitutional dilemmas.  
4.5 Section 36 prevents Constitutional Dilemmas 
 
Eltayeb states that there is no conflict between freedom of expression and religion 
because these rights are interconnected and interdependent and what is required is an 
approach that endorses the principle of universality, indivisibility and interdependence of 
the two freedoms, on the one hand, and strikes the balance and complementarity 
between them on the other.425 
The above statement is very relevant to the South African situation for the following 
reasons: the Constitutional Court has consistently rejected that there is a hierarchy of 
rights under the South African Constitution as all the rights are interconnected and 
interdependent.426  The South African Constitution endorses the principle of universality, 
indivisibility and interdependence of two freedoms and strikes a balance and 
complementarity between them.427 
All rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitation clause in section 36.428  In 
terms of this clause, all rights may be limited if the limitation is in terms of the law of 
general application and is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  This involves a proportionality enquiry, 
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in other words a balancing exercise.429 
If two rights conflict with each other under the South African Constitution balancing of 
the competing interest against the backdrop of the limitation provision would take 
place.430  If two rights under the Constitution come into opposition with each other, one 
right would have to yield to the other.  Determining which right should take precedence 
is always a fact specific enquiry and the outcome would vary from case to case.  This 
means that right ‘A’ will not always be give precedence over right ‘B’ in a limitations 
enquiry because right ‘A’ is more important than right ‘B’.431 
A total conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion does not exist 
under the South African Constitution and therefore a constitutional dilemma does not 
exist.  The reason for this statement has two parts: firstly, the right to freedom of 
expression and religion as contained in the Bill of Rights are not in opposition with each 
other, they are interconnected and interdependent as are all the rights under the 
constitution.432  Secondly, there is no constitutional dilemma under the South African 
Constitution because if rights do conflict with each other the Constitution offers direction 
in the form of the Section 36 proportionality test.  A case by case regulation of the right 
to freedom of expression and freedom of religion is possible and therefore it can be 
concluded that a partial conflict between these rights exist.  
4.6 The Danish cartoons in South Africa 
 
On Friday 3 February 2006 Jamiat-Ul-Ulama a voluntary Muslim association discovered 
that the Sunday Times was going to publish the Mohammed cartoons.  The first thing 
they did was try to get an undertaking by the Sunday Times that it would not publish the 
cartoons and when this failed they sought an urgent interim order in the Johannesburg 
High Court to prohibit the publishers and printers of the newspaper from publishing and 
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distributing the cartoons.433 
4.6.1 Applicant’s submissions 
 
The applicant in this matter is the Jamiat-Ul-Ulama. Mr Cassim and Mr Boda appeared 
for the applicant in this matter.  The relief the applicant sought was an Interdict 
restraining the respondent and their agents and employees from publishing in any 
newspaper, magazine or other publication any cartoons, caricatures or drawings of the 
Prophet Mohammed434.  The applicant makes its submissions in an affidavit and states 
the following regarding the Prophet: 
Islam does not know a depiction of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and it is a principle 
production of the holy Prophet (PBUH) in drawings, paintings etc. are blasphemous.  
The 25 drawings overstep even the bounds of a simple productive drawing but are 
characterised by insulting messages and innuendos that mock at and ridicule Islam and 
its founder.  Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) is the cornerstone of every Muslim's existence.  
Muslims fashion their dress according to his manner of dress.  They grow beards 
because he grew a beard.  They live their daily existence as he lived from rules relating 
to prayer, dress, ablution, eating, etc.435 
Jamiat-Ul-Ulama, in its argument, mentions the world-wide anger at the cartoons in the 
form of threats of violence and boycotts.  It also argues that Muslims in South Africa are 
also being stirred up by the cartoons and submits that it would result in violence and 
unsettlement in the country.436  It further submits that the cartoons are an infringement 
of the right to freedom of religion as it is blasphemous and contains insulting messages 
and innuendos that ridicule Islam and the Prophet Mohammed.437 
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4.6.2 Respondent’s submissions 
 
There are three respondents in this matter, the first respondent is Johncom Media 
Investment Ltd, a publisher of National newspapers of which the Sunday Times is one; 
the second respondent is the newspaper printing company and the third respondent is 
the Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd.  Mr Campbell appeared on behalf of respondent 
one and two, respondent three was unrepresented.438 
The respondents did not reply to the affidavit of the applicant however when the 
applicant sent a letter to the first respondent requesting it to give an undertaking that the 
cartoons would not be published the following was stated by the respondent: 
We acknowledge receipt of your fax dated February 3, 2006 and take note of the 
content.  We are well aware of our responsibilities as journalist.  We recognise that our 
readers have different interests and that these may sometimes be in conflict with each 
other.  We bear this in mind when we make our editorial decisions.  However, we do not 
bow to any pressure though no matter how strongly their views are held or how correct 
they may believe their position to be.  We will decide the issue of the cartoons according 
to the principles we apply to all stories.  We are aware of the sensitivities involved in this 
matter and will take these into consideration.  However we decline to give you any 
undertaking with regard to what our decision may be.439 
The respondent’s argument was that the media is extremely important for the 
development of a democratic culture.  It submitted that the media has obligation to 
citizens to provide them with information and with a platform for the exchange of ideas.  
It further states that the media has a constitutional duty to act with vigour, courage, 
integrity and responsibility and if the media are reliable, democracy will be 
strengthened.440 
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4.6.3 Legal reasoning behind the courts finding 
 
Jamiat-Ul-Ulama was granted the interdict by Judge Mohamed Jajbhay on the grounds 
that the ‘right to dignity outweighed the right to freedom of expression in the context of 
this particular case’.441 
The court balanced the right to freedom of expression and the right to human dignity; it 
indicated that although freedom of expression is an important right for democracy it is 
not a paramount value and must be construed in the context of other values in the 
Constitution, particularly human dignity, equality and freedom.  The court went on to 
discuss the value and importance of human dignity in South Africa stating that: 
The value of human dignity in our Constitution is not only concerned with the sense of 
self-worth of an individual or a group of people but constitutes an affirmation of the worth 
of human beings in our society.  It includes the intrinsic worth of human beings shared 
by all people as well as the individual reputation of each person built upon his or her or 
their own individual achievements.  The value of human dignity in our Constitution 
therefore values both the personal sense of self-worth as well as the public's estimation 
of the worth of value of such an individual or group of persons.442 
The court found that the Cartoons is characterised by an insulting message that 
ridicules Islam and its founder.  It found the cartoons to be demeaning and undignified 
and therefore found that the limitation on freedom of expression was justified in the 
interest of human dignity.443  To further justify its decision the court argued that the 
Cartoon amounts to advocacy of hatred and stereotyping of Muslims which jeopardises 
the core value of the South African nation and reinforces patterns of discrimination and 
inequality.  The limitation of this expression, which encouraged hatred according to the 
court, would achieve national unity.444  In concluding its balancing enquiry it found that 
the appropriate balance between freedom of expression and human dignity with regard 
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to the interdict was to limit freedom of expression because the publishing of the 
cartoons would demean the dignity of an individual whom the Muslim community hold in 
highest regard.445 
It is agreed that a balancing enquiry was necessary as the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to human dignity where in conflict and the South African 
Constitution endorses the principle of universality, indivisibility and interdependence of 
two freedoms and strikes a balance and complementarity between them.446  It is further 
agreed that limiting freedom of expression was necessary to protect the religious dignity 
of Muslims and to prevent a pattern of inequality and discrimination thereby healing the 
divisions of the past.  What is not agreed with is the fact that the Cartoons amount to 
advocacy of hatred.  What this judgement is missing is a proper determination of what 
advocacy of hatred as well as a discussion of hate speech entails and not just a 
submission that the Cartoons constitute advocacy of hatred.  
4.7 The Danish Cartoons does not amount to hate speech 
 
Pillay argues that the Danish cartoons constitutes hate speech in terms of Section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution as it can be argued to be an advocacy of hatred on the listed 
ground of religion and it constitutes incitement to cause harm taking the cartoons 
beyond the realm of free and protected expression.447  Based on the intention of these 
cartoons it is submitted that it does not amount to advocacy of hatred and therefore 
does not amount to hate speech. 
This mini-thesis submits that the purpose of the Danish cartoons was not to promote 
hatred or attempt to instil hatred in others and it does not propose or call for hatred and 
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February 2006). 
446Eltayeb MSM ‘The Limitations on the Critical Thinking on Religious Issues Under Article 20 of ICCPR and its 
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therefore does not amount to advocacy of hatred.  The original reasoning behind 
publishing the cartoons was based on an ‘experiment to overcome what the editors 
perceived as self-censorship reflected in the reluctance of illustrators to depict the 
Prophet’.448  Self-censorship means ‘the tacit acceptance of blackmail, threat or 
intimidation that makes someone stop saying, writing or drawing something they would 
say, write or draw if these conditioning factors did not apply’.449  This mini-thesis further 
submits that in actual fact the fight for freedom of speech is the reason for the 
publishing of the Danish cartoons by the Danish publishers.  The Mail and Guardian’s 
reason for publishing the cartoons was for the purpose of illustration and education, its 
intention was totally different from the Danish Newspaper.450 
In order for speech to be considered hate speech two things have to be met: (1) the 
expression must amount to advocacy of hatred on one of the listed grounds, and (2) the 
advocacy of hatred must constitute incitement to cause harm.451  Pillay makes a valid 
point that the Danish cartoon falls within section 162(c) because ‘the publications 
reinforce particular stereotypes of Muslims that feed into pre-existing prejudices and are 
therefore dangerous and threatening for Muslims’.452  However, based on the intention 
of the Publishers in Denmark and South Africa, the Danish cartoon does not pass the 
first hurdle of the high threshold test as it does not amount to advocacy of hatred.  
Because of this, Danish cartoons do not amount to hate speech and therefore is 
protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to determine whether the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression were in conflict with each other and caused a 
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constitutional dilemma under the South African Constitution.  
To determine these issues the scope of freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
was discussed and it was determined that these rights protect a wide range of values 
and interests, making the potential for an overlap very real.  The right to freedom of 
religion and human dignity contextualized forms the right to religious dignity.  This right 
prohibits the ridiculing of the Islamic religion because the dignity of the religious 
community or its members, in respect of their beliefs, doctrine, structures and modus 
operandi, would be violated.  The role human dignity played in the conflict between 
religion and expression is extending the scope of freedom of religion to include the 
protection of the religious dignity of the Islamic community thereby overlapping the 
scope of freedom of religion and freedom of expression and creating a conflict. 
It was established that the ridiculing of religious beliefs created an inter-right partial 
conflict between the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression meaning that 
a case by case regulation was still possible.  The regulation came in the form of the 
limitation clause which offers direction on resolving this conflict thereby preventing a 
total conflict and a constitutional dilemma. 
The approach the court used to solve the conflict between freedom of expression and 
human dignity was to institute a balancing enquiry.  This mini-thesis agreed with the 
approach as there was a need to strike a balance and complementarity between them.  
It is further agreed that the limiting freedom of expression was necessary to protect the 
religious dignity of Muslims and to prevent a pattern of inequality and discrimination 
thereby healing the divisions of the past.  The court’s submission that the Cartoons 
amounts to advocacy of hatred was not agreed with, the judgment did not contain a 
proper determination of what advocacy of hatred is and did not discuss what hate 
speech entails, it just submitted that cartoons constituted advocacy of hatred.  Based on 
the intention of the Publishers in Denmark and South Africa, the Danish cartoon does 
not pass the first hurdle of the high threshold test as it does not amount to advocacy of 
hatred.  Because of this, Danish cartoons do not amount to hate speech and therefore 
is protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this min-thesis was to determine if the right to freedom of 
religion conflicted with the right to freedom of expression under the South African 
Constitution and the secondary objective was to establish an appropriate manner in 
which this conflict could be addressed. This section summarise the major findings of the 
study. 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of chapter two was to discuss incidents where the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression have come into conflict with each other as well as 
theories on the conflict of human rights in order to establish how a conflict of human 
rights should be dealt with, the historical and philosophical aspects of the right to 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression was discussed and this chapter laid the 
foundation for the discussion on the conflict between these rights.453 Blasphemy in 
general and blasphemy in Islam were discussed and it was established that insults and 
depictions of the Prophet Muhammad is considered to be blasphemous under the 
Islamic religion.454  It was further established that the reason why most of the conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression stem from the religion of Islam 
is because Muslims have to accept all commandments, rules and values as they are 
Allah’s rules; this is a big reason why Muslims cannot agree with Western law.455 
The incidence of conflict discussed in this chapter between freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression where the Salman Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoon 
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controversy.  These incidences provided little guidance on how to deal with a conflict of 
rights.  The Salman Rushdie affair confirmed that blasphemy is a common law offence 
which only protects the Christian religion.  Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses 
book could not be prosecuted for blasphemy against Islam because the religion of Islam 
fell outside the scope of blasphemy in the United Kingdom.456 
In order to resolve the conflict caused by the Danish cartoons the UN implemented a 
resolution called defamation of religions, however the conflicting traditions, cultures and 
religions between Islam and the west have resulted in an on going debate over the 
purpose and content of the resolution.  Although the Danish cartoon controversy did not 
provide us with guidance on how to deal with the conflict between the right to freedom 
of religion and freedom of expression, it was established that the core of the problem 
lies in the conflicting tradition, culture and religion of Islam and the west.457 
Habermas’ Theory on solving conflicts and Konrad Hesse’s notion on 
PraktischeKkonkordanz was discussed in order to provide us with guidance on how to 
deal with the conflict of rights, and although both theories provide guidance on solving 
conflicts of rights, this mini-thesis has established flaws in both of these theories.458 
The purpose of chapter three was to determine whether the right to freedom of religion 
and the right to freedom of expression conflicted under international human rights law.  
The ICCPR was discussed to determine the conflict under International law because it 
is a binding covenant and more than three quarters of the UN’s member States are 
bound by the ICCPR under treaty law.  It could be argued that all nations, regardless if 
they signed the covenant or not, may be bound by the ICCPR under customary 
International law.459  This chapter determined that a conflict between freedom of religion 
and freedom of expression does not exist under the ICCPR because freedom of 
expression protects ridiculing the religious beliefs of others and claiming the protection 
of religion is not a legitimate ground for limiting freedom of expression.460  It further 
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established that the right to have one’s religion or belief at all times exempted from 
criticism or ridicule is not included under international human rights law and no right or 
duty is placed on a person to respect another’s religious feelings.461  Insulting a 
person’s religious beliefs and practices under the ICCPR is not a threat or limit to a 
person’s right to freedom of religion and it also does not affect a person’s freedom to 
have or adopt a religion or belief or to freely exercise the religion or belief in question 
and therefore would not be a justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression.462 
As the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression has not come into conflict 
under international law, the regional division of Europe was discussed.  The ECtHR had 
the opportunity of examining freedom of expression in relation to freedom of religion in a 
string of cases relating to the protection of religious feelings; these cases are Otto-
Preminger v Austria, Wingrove v The United Kingdom and I.A v Turkey.  In each of 
these cases the States suppressed expression in order to protect religious feelings and 
the ECtHR found this suppression of expression justified.463  Based on these cases the 
mini-thesis concluded that when a conflict arises between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion under the ECHR it should be looked at based on its facts and the 
ECtHR seems to indicate that the relationship between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion should be decided by democratic governments based on the wide 
margin of appreciation given by the court.464  The analysis of the case law has indicated 
that the way to solve the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
is not to declare that one right should automatically be favoured over the other but that a 
case by case enquiry should be taken in order to establish which right should prevail.465 
The primary purpose of chapter four was to determine whether the right to freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression were in conflict with each other and caused a 
constitutional dilemma under the South African Constitution.  
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This chapter discussed the scope of freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
under the South African constitution and it determined that these rights protect a wide 
range of values and interest, making the potential for an overlap very real.466  This 
chapter established that the right to freedom of religion and human dignity 
contextualized forms the right to religious dignity and this right prohibits the ridiculing of 
the Islamic religion because the dignity the religious community or its members in 
respect of their beliefs, doctrine, structures and modus operandi would be violated.467  
The role human dignity played in the conflict between religion and expression is 
extending the scope of freedom of religion to include the protection of the religious 
dignity of the Islamic community thereby overlapping the scope of freedom of religion 
and expression and creating a conflict.468 
It was established that the ridiculing of religious beliefs created an inter-right partial 
conflict between the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion meaning that 
a case by case regulation was still possible.  The regulation came in the form of the 
limitation clause which offers direction on resolving this conflict thereby preventing a 
total conflict and a constitutional dilemma.469 
The South African approach to solving the conflict between freedom of expression and 
human dignity was to institute a balancing enquiry.  This mini-thesis agreed with the 
approach as there was a need to strike a balance and complementarity between 
them.470   This mini-thesis agreed that the limiting freedom of expression was necessary 
to protect the religious dignity of Muslims and to prevent a pattern of inequality and 
discrimination thereby healing the divisions of the past.471  The court’s submission that 
the Cartoons amount to advocacy of hatred was not agreed with, the judgment did not 
contain a proper determination of what advocacy of hatred is and did not discuss what 
hate speech entails, it just submitted that the cartoons constituted advocacy of 
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hatred.472  Based on the intention of the Publishers in Denmark and South Africa, the 
Danish cartoon does not pass the first hurdle of the high threshold test as it does not 
amount to advocacy of hatred.  Because of this, Danish cartoons do not amount to hate 
speech and therefore is protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression.473 
This mini-thesis has established that the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression does conflict under the South African Constitution but that this conflict does 
not create a constitutional dilemma.474  It further established that if two rights conflict 
with each other under the South African Constitution, balancing of the competing 
interest against the backdrop of the limitation provision would take place, a fact specific 
enquiry would be undertaken and the outcome would vary from case to case.  This mini-
thesis agrees that an appropriate manner to deal with the conflict between freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression is to balance them on a case by case basis.475 
5.3 Recommendations on how to deal with the conflict between freedom 
of religion and freedom of expression 
 
This mini- thesis has established that an inter-right partial conflict between freedom of 
religion and expression exist under the South African Constitution and various 
approaches to solving conflict of rights, including the South African approach, have 
been discussed.  This mini- thesis is focused on the conflict between freedom of religion 
and freedom of expression.  The conflict between these rights are essentially due to the 
different cultures and religions between Islam and the west, as is evident in the 
discussion of the Salman Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoon controversy.  Therefore 
in order to solve this conflict we have to create a platform of understanding and respect 
between Islam and the west.476 
The way in which understanding and respect between Islam and the west may be 
implemented is by the creation of channels to enable dialogue in order to clarify 
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misunderstandings, bringing together the western media with the Islamic media and 
creating an assurance to the Islamic world of the respect of the papers and their home 
countries.477  A better understanding and awareness of the Islamic culture should be 
undertaken globally and better responsiveness to global requirements in the editorial 
work should not be as a restriction to free speech but as an addition to it.478   
Finally, we should not only focus on respecting Islamic traditions; this will not find a true 
solution.  There has to be reciprocity and respect in Islamic societies, for the democratic 
traditions of other countries should also be undertaken.479  In order to solve the partial 
conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion under the South African 
Constitution global, communication has to take place between Islam and the west. 
 
 
Word count: 34 331 
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